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FACING UP: A REPLYt
JOSEPH RAZ*
We are all familiar with the peculiar feeling of coming across one's
past objectified, as when one overhears others telling how they perceived
a certain event in which one played the hero's role. Reading the contri-
butions to this issue was a bit like that. In particular, it made me realise
how I have abused the tolerant paper by writing all too much, while
leaving so many hostages to fortune, so many loose ends, and expressing
so many half-baked ideas. It is also embarrassing because it is like a
summons to the confessional, to repent my sins of omission and commis-
sion, and to recant. I'll do a certain amount of that, while declining the
invitation to undertake a thorough character reform.
I should probably be more repentant than I am. Given more time to
cogitate, I would probably come to realise a greater need to modify my
views than will be evident from this reply, for it is only a preliminary
reaction to the many careful and thoughtful points made by the contribu-
tors to this symposium. At times my comments are tentative. At times I
will overlook points which require careful considerations. In all cases I
strove to see for this I take to be my responsibility whether the essential
position I advanced in the past could be defended. But its defence
requires recognition that some views I have put forward were more
peripheral than others, and some were less well considered than others.
Happily, the criticism addressed at me tends to be concentrated
around a number of central issues. I will try to focus my reply on the
essential points raised by these criticisms. My reply is just that. I make
no attempt to comment on the many rich ideas presented and suggestions
made in the various articles, but merely respond to the criticism of my
work within them.
t I am grateful to David Dolinko, John Fisher, Steve Munzer, and Carl Craner for
comments on a draft of part of this Article.
* Professor of the Philosophy of Law at Oxford University and Fellow of Balliol College. D.
Phil., 1967, Oxford University.
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I. REASONS-ORDINARY AND EXCLUSIONARY
Our understanding of law is greatly defective unless it includes and
is based on a sound view of the role of law in practical reasoning. The
first precept of legal theory is that law is practical, that its essential func-
tion is to play a role in its subjects' reasoning about what to do.I I will
return to this proposition below. I mention it here because it means that
a theory of law assumes an understanding of practical rationality. I wish
I had a more complete account of this subject to offer, or that I knew of
one I could endorse. Unfortunately, my account of it leaves much to be
desired. Some mistakes are pointed out in this symposium. Stephen
Perry is clearly right in saying that I have failed to provide an adequate
explanation of the role of uncertainty or risk in practical reasoning.2 On
this occasion, however, I will largely confine myself to a consideration of
the case against exclusionary reasons.
A. ON THE REALITY OF CONFLICTS OF REASONS
A few words about the reality of conflicts of reasons are called for as
a preliminary to a discussion of the special type of conflict to which
exclusionary reasons give rise. According to Moore, what appear as con-
flicts of reasons may in fact be cases in which reasons are subject to
exceptions. Once the exceptions are taken into account the appearance
of conflict dissolves. This seems to me to be mistaken. Exceptions are at
home when we consider rules, especially authoritative, institutionalised
rules. There are no exceptions to a reason. There are merely cases to
1. This point is the cornerstone of Burton's contribution to this symposium, in which some of
its implications are most usefully illustrated. See Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L.
REv. 747 (1989).
2. See Perry, Second Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 913,
924-25 (1989). Perry is inclined to think that uncertainty can be accounted for only by regarding
people's beliefs (that a certain event may happen, etc.) as reasons. I still tend to resist this view. I
think myself that in these cases, as in reasoning which is free of uncertainty, reasons for actions arc
(in general) belief-independent facts, though they may be facts about the evidence available to partic-
ular reasoners. This is necessary to account for the difference between our assessment of Robert and
of Roberta, who both think, let us say, that it is likely that commodity prices will decline in the near
future, and who both reach this conclusion by reasoning in the same way from the same beliefs.
Assume further, however, that Robert has available to him information not available to Roberta, the
existence or relevance of which he failed to appreciate, and which should have alerted him to the fact
that commodities will rise in price. We wish to criticize him, but not her, for failure in reasoning.
The difference is not in the beliefs which were their reasons. It is in the evidence available to them,
that is in the existence of facts that Robert could have found out about, or could have known to be
reasons bearing on the issue.
Throughout, my discussion is confined to guiding reasons. Beliefs in (guiding) reasons are
explanatory reasons. For an example of the distinction between the two see J. RAz, PRACTICAL
REASONS AND NORMS (1975).
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which it does not apply. But where it does apply, it may still be overrid-
den or defeated. A promise which was voluntarily given ought to be
kept. If it is overridden by the need to attend to an emergency, it is not
overridden because there is no reason to keep the promise in such cir-
cumstances, but because there is a greater reason which conflicts with it.3
Contrary to Moore's observations, the reason for accepting the real-
ity of conflict is not that "our subjective emotional experiences are evi-
dence of ... objective moral features." 4 There is no special emotional
experience characteristic of belief in the existence of conflicts, nor would
it be of great relevance if there was (at least not in the way indicated by
Moore). We are not concerned with the discovery of some mysterious
moral facts which are indirectly observed by the traces they leave in our
emotional life. The question whether reasons conflict is not a substantive
moral question. It is a conceptual one. It is neither an issue about the
structure of our emotional states, nor about the content of morality, but
about a formal property of the concept of reason.
The reasons for an action are considerations that count in favour of
that action. We can think of them as the facts, statements of which form
the premises of a sound inference to the conclusion that the action ought
to be done. That considerations which establish the disadvantages of the
action obtain as well, does not in the least show that the reasons do not
exist, nor does it show that the reasons are subject to an "exception."
The original reason is still there. The inference drawn from it (that the
act ought to be done) is still valid. The conflicting considerations merely
show that there are conflicting reasons, that is, that there is also a sound
inference to the conclusion that the act ought not to be done.5
Rules are different. They belong to the lower level of any two-level
way of understanding practical reasoning. That is, they are based on
reasons. Usually, each rule is based upon a number of reasons, and they
reflect a judgment that within the scope of the rule those reasons defeat
3. My own account of this kind of conflict, which includes the presence of exclusionary rea-
sons, is more complex, but we can overlook the complexity here.
4. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 827, 848 (1989).
5. Such a conflict does not amount to a contradiction. For an explanation of the sense of
"ought"-sentences, which explains how it can be that we ought to perform an action while also being
the case that we ought not to do so see PRACTICAL REASONING, 11-15 (J. Raz ed. 1978). This
account presupposes that practical inferences are defeasible in the sense explained by philosophers
such as A.J.P. Kenny and R. Chisholm. See Kenny, Practical Reasoning and Rational Appetite, in
PRACTICAL REASONING, supra, at 63; Chisholm, Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement, in
PRACTICAL REASONING, supra, at 118.
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various, though not necessarily all, conflicting reasons. Rules are, meta-
phorically speaking, expressions of compromises, of judgments about the
outcome of conflicts. Here, talk of exceptions comes into its own. Char-
acteristically, cases are "simply" outside the scope of the rule if the main
reasons that support the rule do not apply to such cases. A case falls
under an exception to the rule when some of the main reasons for the
rule apply to the case, but the "compromise reflected in the rule" deems
other, conflicting reasons to prevail in such a case. It is in this sense that
"You may deceive to save life," if true, is an exception to the rule,
"Never deceive," if there is such a rule. Since exceptions belong to the
logic of rules and do not apply to reasons, they cannot be used to show
that reasons do not conflict. In fact, exceptions to rules exist precisely
when reasons do conflict.6
B. SOME NON-EXISTING AMBIGUITIES
Moore thinks that I have been using the term "exclusionary rea-
sons" in three different senses; Perry thinks that I have been using it in
two., I think they are both wrong. Exclusionary reasons are reasons
against acting for certain reasons. This is, as I understand him, the sec-
ond of Moore's senses. As he notes, I explicitly mention and reject the
other two senses in which he thinks that I am using the term. The first
sense identifies exclusionary reasons with (first-order) reasons not to
engage in certain thoughts, or not to reflect on certain issues. This is,
Moore alleges, the sense of the term in the following passage:
Jill has made a rule to spend her holidays in France.... Jill... faces
many conflicting considerations, but she has no intention to act on the
balance of reasons. She has adopted a rule to spend her holidays in
France and she did so precisely in order to spare herself the necessity
of deciding every year what to do during the holidays. She adopted the
rule in order not to have to act on the balance of reasons on each
occasion. Having the rule is like having decided in advance what to
do. When the holidays come she is not going to reconsider the matter.
Her mind is already made up. Her rule is for her an exclusionary rea-
7
son ....
6. There are also exceptions to what we say, and the remarks about exceptions to rules apply
to them as well. If I assert that one should never deceive, I may nevertheless admit to an exception
when deceit is necessary to save life. What we say expresses our judgment on all the relevant consid-
erations we are aware of, and is subject to exceptions when the main reasons which apply to the case
are overridden in particular circumstances.
7. See Raz, Reasons for Action, Decisions and Norms, in PRACTICAL REASONING, supra note
5, at 140-41; cf. Moore, supra note 4, at 855.
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It seems to me that "exclusionary reason" is used here in its proper
sense, as explained above. For Jill, her rule is an exclusionary reason.
Her reason for adopting such a rule is, it is true, to avoid having to
decide every year where to go on her holidays. This may be because she
does not like to reflect on the relative merits of various holiday resorts,
but it need not be. Her reason may be a desire to avoid the uncertainty
as to where she will be, the anxiety of having to decide, or a number of
other factors. Be they what they may, they are her reasons for the rule.
They are not to be confused with the rule itself. The rule is a reason to
go to France, as well as a reason for not acting on certain considerations
(for example, that hotels in Ibiza offer particularly attractive deals this
year). If the reason for the rule is a desire to avoid the need to reflect on
certain matters, the rule can help with this goal, since if one's mind is
already made up, one reason for the unwanted reflection disappears.
Notice that even after Jill has adopted the rule she has no reason not to
reflect on the merits of various resorts. If she wants to contemplate such
matters she is free to do so. She merely no longer has any need to do so,
because she has a reason for not acting on the outcome of such reflec-
tions. She should follow her rule instead. This was the purpose of the
rule as stated in the original passage. It relieves her of the need to reflect
on the merit, without implying that there is anything wrong in doing so if
she wishes to.'
Moore detects another sense in which I use "exclusionary reasons."
In this sense exclusionary reasons "actually change what counts as a
right-making characteristic of an action," 9 they "exclude... other rea-
sons... from counting at all."'1 Moore advises the reader not to allow
"Raz's explicit definition of 'exclusionary reasons', his special... exam-
ples of them, and the alignment of both within the Kantian tradition in
ethics, [to] blind us to [this] third interpretation of exclusionary rea-
sons."1 I The only reason I can detect for ascribing the ambiguity is that
"some of [Raz's] best examples of exclusionary reasons are most fruit-
fully unpacked with this justificatory interpretation."1 " I think that
Moore is simply trying to be charitable here. He must know that his
claim, if correct, may show that my analysis of the examples he has in
8. As usual, different cases will differ in their rationale. There may be cases where, given that
one's judgment is unreliable, there is reason for one not to contemplate the pros and cons if doing so
may lead one to act on one's judgment. But given that one's decision or rule puts an end to this
danger, once it is adopted there is no longer a reason not to reflect, idly, on the merits.
9. Moore, supra note 4, at 857.
10. Id. at 854.
11. Id. at 857.
12. Id. at 858.
19891 1157
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1153
mind, in terms of exclusionary reasons, is mistaken, and that those exam-
ples are to be understood in some other way. He must know that there is
nothing here to point to an ambiguity, but he gently prefers to ascribe to
me an ambiguity rather than a mistake.
"Exclusionary reasons" is a technical term adopted to explain fea-
tures of our reasoning which are frequently ignored. The analysis of the
role of these reasons in practical thought is, therefore, anything but a
straightforward observation of the obvious. My argument was that
promising binds us to disregard certain reasons. Moore suggests that it
would be better to interpret promising as turning reasons which count
into ones which do not count. I have pointed out, and he acknowledges
the fact, that the reasons which we are to disregard are not canceled. He
says, in effect, that I must mean that they are not canceled on the first
level but they are canceled on the second level, for they are preempted
from affecting the rightness of the action.1 3 This is yet more technical
terminology, and I find it difficult to understand what it means. We
understand what an exclusionary reason means. It simply means a rea-
son not to act for a certain reason. We are, for example, familiar with
spouses promising their partners to decide how to spend the weekend in
the light of their own desires, disregarding what they think their partners
want. Their promises are exclusionary reasons, reasons to exclude a con-
sideration from being the ground for any decision they may make.
Hence, there is no mystery about the nature and existence of exclusion-
ary reasons. But how reasons which are neither canceled, nor excluded
or overridden, can fail to affect the rightness of the action is not obvious.
I do not wish to deny that some further technical distinctions may be
useful, nor that something like the idea intimated by Moore may figure
among them, once it receives a proper explanation. But Moore provides
none.
Still, it is possible that Moore is right in suggesting that my analysis
of all or some cases fails on its own terms, that to meet the points I am
making one needs not exclusionary reasons but some other notion. The
most likely candidate is that of canceling reasons. Think of it this way:
Think of John, who is subject to an (undefeated) exclusionary reason.
Let us assume that it affects the outcome of his deliberations, that is, that
the action indicated by the balance of all first-order reasons is different
from the action required by the balance of the unexcluded reasons only.
John, I have argued, is acting correctly only if he disregards the excluded
13. See id. Perry seems to entertain a similar view of the only way in which to understand
what he calls "objective" exclusionary reasons. See Perry, supra note 2, at 928 n.48.
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reasons in his deliberations. I do not mean that he must not think of
them, only that he must not base his action on them. He must not act for
those reasons. Before he acts, the right action to take from his perspec-
tive is the one which is indicated by the unexcluded reasons. How is he
to judge his own conduct after he acts? Assume that he acts correctly
from the point of view of the ex ante considerations. His action may be
out of step with the balance of first-order reasons, but on the other hand
it is in accord with the exclusionary reasons, and this explains and justi-
fies the deviation from first-order reasons. He could not conform both to
them and to the exclusionary reason, and the exclusionary one prevails.
Well, this is almost right. He could not conform to both the balance of
first-order reasons and the exclusionary reasons if he reasons correctly.
Assume, however, that he makes a mistake. While completely disre-
garding the excluded reasons and letting them play no part in his motiva-
tion, John nevertheless performed the action which is in fact indicated by
the balance of all the first-order reasons. He simply miscalculated. Para-
doxically his mistake seems to be rather fortunate. Because of it he man-
aged to conform both to the exclusionary reason (he did not act for any
excluded reason) and to the balance of first-order reasons. Up to a point
this is a familiar puzzle. It is a general feature of the difference between
judging actions ex ante and judging them ex post. Sometimes when try-
ing to act on the evidence before us we make a mistake which turns out
to be a lucky one, and we perform an action which the partial evidence
available at the time, correctly evaluated, did not justify, but which is in
fact justified in the light of all the facts of the case.
But are exclusionary reasons to be understood in this way? As
Moore recognises, some clearly are. Many exclusionary reasons are "evi-
dential" in character. That is, their justification is that conformity to
them will lead to improved conformity with the excluded reasons. This
is the case, for example, when a person refrains from acting on new infor-
mation because he is too tired, intoxicated, or otherwise unable to trust
his judgment of its significance. Clearly, if by luck his action conforms to
the reasons furnished by the information which he dismissed, no one can
complain. The same is true if the exclusion is justified on rational
grounds of saving labor, time, or anxiety, which while not improving
conformity with the excluded reasons, specifically make the agent com-
ply better with reasons generally. Certain reasons are justifiably
excluded. One does not act for them. Supposing that the exclusion
would have led to a suboptimal action, but that a miscalculation led the
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agent to the optimal action, we simply count him lucky. There is no
mystery or paradox in this.
At other times, the exclusion is justified directly by motivational
considerations. If Colin promised to disregard his own interest in decid-
ing on the education of his son, then he has discharged his duty if he did
indeed disregard his interest. If his misunderstanding of the merits of
various schools fortuitously led him to choose one which suits his inter-
ests as well, then all we can say is that he is lucky. Perhaps we should
also say that his son is unlucky, because but for this mistake a school
which is better for the son would have been chosen. But this is no
ground for condemning the decision, for after all the parent's interests
matter as well, and we are assuming that in this case and within these
bounds they outweigh those of the son.
These are individual examples of the way (some) exclusionary rea-
sons work. My aim in introducing the concept was of course more ambi-
tious. I claimed that it helps explain certain concepts, especially those of
decision, mandatory rule, authority, and promises, by ascribing to them a
special role in practical reasoning. Does that part of my explanation sur-
vive the apparent paradox of luck through miscalculation? Again, it
seems to me that it does. There is, however, a complicating factor in
these cases, and it may explain Moore's suspicion that I need something
stronger than a mere exclusion. The complicating factor is that the men-
tioned concepts are explained in terms of protected reasons. These are,
as Moore mentioned, a combination of an exclusionary reason and a first-
order reason. So these notions are indeed explained by reference to
something stronger than mere exclusionary reasons. Rules, promises,
decisions, and authoritative decrees affect the outcome not only by
excluding certain considerations, but also by adding certain reasons to
the balance of first-order reasons. How does that factor affect the case of
luck through miscalculation?
We need to distinguish between the two ways in which the first-
order reasons provided by promises, authoritative directives, rules, and
decisions can be related to the reasons excluded by the exclusionary
aspect of such protected reasons. The first-order reasons may be meant
to reflect the excluded ones, or they may be meant to add to them. A
decision is typically meant to reflect the reasons which led (or should
have led) to it." An authoritative rule prohibiting the marketing of a
14. A decision is meant to reflect reasons which were within the ambit of the factors consid-




dangerous toy is similarly meant to reflect the reasons that make the toy
too dangerous for use by children. A court's decision that the plaintiff
defamed the defendant and is liable to pay damages is likewise meant to
reflect considerations that applied to the plaintiff prior to the decision.
But a law imposing a tax on capital gains, while reflecting reasons which
indicate that people who benefit from capital appreciation should con-
tribute to financing public projects, also adds to the excluded reasons. It
settles precisely how much one should pay, at what time and to what
address such contributions should be made, and so on. It thus creates
"new" first-order reasons, such as, to file reports within a certain period,
to pay within a certain period, or to pay a particular sum rather than a
little less or a little more, etc. When we talk of acting on the right bal-
ance of reasons, with the excluded reasons taken into account, we mean
all the first-order reasons, including the new first-order reasons created
by the promise, the law, etc., but excluding the "dependent" first-order
reasons created by the promise, the law etc., which are merely a reflec-
tion of other first-order reasons, and which should not be allowed to
count twice. 15
In putting forward the normal justification thesis as part of a theory
of authority, I emphasized the fact that the rationale of authority is, in
the last resort, that it facilitates conformity with reason. Authority is
legitimate only where conformity with reason is better and more securely
assured by following authority than by acting on one's own. This is con-
sistent with the fact that conformity to the authority's demand may be,
on occasion though not in general, sub-optimific. For example, on occa-
sion it may fail to reflect correctly the underlying reasons which it is
meant to reflect. Therefore, here again conformity to the balance of first-
order reasons in an individual case which may result from misunder-
standing what one has to do to conform with an authoritative directive is
a lucky mistake, provided that the balance includes all the previously
existing reasons (including the excluded ones), plus the new first-order
reasons added by the authority, but excluding the dependent first-order
reasons added by the authority.
I believe that the same sort of analysis satisfactorily accounts for the
similar lucky mistakes in observing promises. Of course, the analysis has
to be sensitive to the different reasons for the validity of promises. Some
are binding because of their contribution to cementing special relations,
others because of the basis they provide for relying on other people's
15. For a detailed explanation of the argument from double counting, see J. RAz, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 59 (1986).
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conduct. Depending on the reasons for the validity of the promise, the
exclusionary element of it may primarily reflect motivational considera-
tions, or insurance against change of conduct if underlying reasons
change, or are thought to change, etc. The analysis will vary with the
kind of case involved, but will always, I think, make use of the concep-
tual structures I analysed. I may be wrong in thinking that, but Moore
has not provided an argument to show that I am. I provisionally con-
clude that Moore has detected neither an ambiguity in the notion of
"exclusionary reason" nor a defect in its application (at least none that is
indicated by his discussion of the ambiguities).
Perry alleges yet another ambiguity in "exclusionary reasons."
Sometimes the term means a reason not to act for a certain reason (the
objective interpretation), whereas at other times it means a reason not to
rely on one's belief in a reason (the subjective interpretation). 6 Like
Moore, Perry is really criticizing my analysis (in this case of authority)
rather than pointing to an ambiguity. I have, in the past, considered his
suggestion, and for good or ill I have rejected it in the following terms:
Incapacity-based exclusionary reasons differ from all others.., in that
they depend on the circumstances of the agent at the time he decides
what to do. This may incline people to think that such reasons are not
exclusionary reasons at all.... [S]ome may claim that incapacity is a
reason for not acting on one's judgment (because it is likely to go
wrong). It is not a reason for not acting on valid reasons. It is obvious
that the fact that one's judgment may be wrong is in such circum-
stances the ground for the reason. But is it also true that the reason is
a reason for mistrusting one's judgment rather than for not acting on
certain reasons? One cannot act for a reason unless one believes in its
validity. The practical relevance of a reason not to act for a reason
that p is, therefore, the same as the practical relevance of the reason
not to act for p, if one believes that p is a valid reason. In an obvious
sense the latter is a reason not to act on one's beliefs. But in this sense
every second-order reason is also a reason to act on or to refrain from
acting on one's beliefs in reasons. There is no independent argument
which I can see which shows that only reasons grounded in temporary
incapacity are reasons not to act on one's beliefs or that they are not
reasons not to act on reasons.
17
I take it that this passage shows that there was no ambiguity in my
usage. I simply chose a different analysis than that preferred by Perry.
Clearly, if the argument cited here is good at all, it applies not only to
16. See Perry, supra note 2, at 928-29.
17. J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 48 (footnote omitted).
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temporary incapacity but also to cases of authority based on superior
knowledge, upon which Perry focuses his attention.
Was my judgment sound? It is based on holding that (1) all second-
order reasons are also reasons to act or not to act on one's judgment; (2)
there is no practical difference between a reason to act on one's judgment
that p and a reason to act on p; and (3) there is no special reason to
prefer the subjective construction (favoured by Perry) in some cases and
not in others. The first of these propositions still seems true to me. The
second can be challenged in the following way. It is true, it can be said,
from the point of view of the agent before the act, from the ex ante per-
spective. But evaluation of the action from an ex post point of view
shows the difference. If one does not back one's judgment and happens
to conform to reason, then one has done all one had reason to do if one
acts on a reason not to trust one's judgment, but one acts wrongly if one
had reason not to act for a reason. By now this argument sounds famil-
iar. It is the mirror image of the argument we canvassed above in consid-
ering Moore's alleged third sense of "exclusionary reasons." That
discussion also exposed the fallacy of this argument. If you do not trust
your judgment and do not act for the excluded reason, you comply with
the exclusionary reason. If, through luck or miscalculation, you never-
theless happen also to conform with the excluded reason, you made a
lucky mistake. It therefore seems to me that the second of my original
propositions is also true.
The trouble starts with the third proposition. Even if true, it falls
short of the mark. It merely establishes that there is as much reason to
support the objective interpretation as to support the subjective interpre-
tation. It does not establish the superiority of one over the other. Fur-
thermore, is not the fact that the ground for the reason is in one's
subjective incapacity, or inferior competence, reason enough to distin-
guish these cases from the others and give them a subjective interpreta-
tion preserving the objective one to the others? I think that defective
though my argument was, it can be supplemented by two further pro-
positions, which make it good: (4) Ultimately, reasons are facts, and our
beliefs matter only inasmuch and because they aim at the facts. (Perry
agrees with this.) This seems to me to suggest that the objective interpre-
tation is true of the ordinary case. Perry also seems implicitly to agree
that the fourth proposition provides a general motive in favour of the
objective interpretation which prevails in all cases in which there is no
special reason to prefer the subjective one. (5) There are strong reasons
to prefer a unitary interpretation. If this is so, then it should be the
19891 1163
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objective one. This much follows from the fourth proposition. The rea-
son for preserving a unitary interpretation (while not denying that the
grounds for an exclusionary reason are sometimes in subjective incapaci-
ties, inferiority of judgment, etc.) is that the different cases shade into
each other.
Perry's discussion very clearly shows the strains of nonuniformity.
He regards authoritative directives as being subjective reasons, for he
takes authorities to be based primarily on expertise and superior knowl-
edge. He recognises that I argue that "sometimes" they are based on
reasons of coordination, but he fails to integrate this point into his
account. In fact, in my view, political authorities are justified primarily
on grounds of coordination, 8 though these are mixed with considera-
tions of expertise. For example, expertise predominates in matters of
consumer protection legislation, but there and in other cases such as tax-
ation, where financial expertise plays a (usually modest) role in justifying
governmental action, superior knowledge is mixed with considerations of
the government's ability to achieve concerted action in society. Think
also of the courts. On the one hand, they are appointed with a view to
expert knowledge of the law to improve the quality of their findings. On
the other hand, they are justified as institutionalised ways of containing
and channeling disputes. Both justifications play their role in arguments
for the authority of the courts. It would be extremely awkward to con-
struct an account of authority which carefully distinguishes the role of
objective reasons from that of subjective reasons. The different consider-
ations are too closely intertwined. They are mutually supportive and are
inseparable in their operation.
Given this strong case for a unitary account, and the possibility of
providing it in terms of exclusionary reasons (i.e., Perry's objective inter-
pretation of them), which allows that some of their grounds have to do
with unreliability of the subjects' judgments or the expertise of the
authority, I conclude that not only the case for an ambiguity but also the
case for a fault in the analysis remain unproven.
C. THE PRESENCE OF EXCLUSIONARY REASONS
Moore argues that my reasons for believing that exclusionary rea-
sons feature importantly in our practical reasoning are inconclusive. In
Practical Reason and Norms I tried to give both functional and phenome-
nological reasons for accepting the prevalence of exclusionary reasons,
18. See J. RAz, THE MORALITY Or FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 56.
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though their mere presence, and occasional validity, can be more directly
established by appeal to examples. Moore concentrates on the phenome-
nological argument. He takes it to be an argument that the common
experience of people is evidence of the structure of real moral reasons.19
It is not that. It is an argument about features of our concepts, based on
the way they function in our discourse and thought. But that is not an
adequate reply to Moore's observation that there are other ways of
accounting for the phenomenological features I isolated. He seems to me
to be partly right. My description of the phenomenological features
which show the presence of exclusionary reasons was far too crude and
undiscriminating.
Moore's criticism concentrates exclusively on my invocation of per-
ceptions of conflicting assessments of what we ought to do.2" He rightly
points out that there could be other explanations of such conflicting
assessments. However, he largely disregards two other features of our
self-understanding which I relied on. They are the fact that we some-
times think, for example, in the presence of superior orders, that it is not
for us to act on the ordinary reasons which apply to the case. That task
was assigned to our commanders, and that is precisely what it is to be
under someone's command. He also disregards my invocation, again
when confronted with orders, or promises, of the two ways of assessing
the matter, which do not leave us undecided, since we know which
assessments prevail, but which represent a two-level structure of reason-
ing rather than merely the presence of conflict within one evaluation. It
expresses itself in saying that our hands are tied; or that we can see that
reason points one way, but we are bound, by our allegiance to our superi-
ors, or by our promises, to act another way. These features are not expli-
cable as the expression of perceived conflicts of reasons. As I mentioned,
they are characteristic of certain situations only and are entirely absent
from ordinary conflicts of reasons. I agree that their existence may be
susceptible of some other explanation, 21 but my case rests in large mea-
sure on the other two arguments that Moore does not consider at any
great length.
Let me briefly rehearse some of them. As I do so I will deal with
another of Moore's criticisms, namely that there is an overwhelming
19. See Moore, supra note 4, at 861.
20. See id. He also refers to my saying that in such cases reasons, or their evaluations, are
incommensurate, id. at 863, but I do not rely on incommensurability in my argument.
21. In J. RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 41-43, I wrongly said that
the presence of conflicting assessments alone can be decisive proof of the belief in reasons which
should be understood as exclusionary ones.
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moral objection to the validity of any exclusionary reasons. Exclusionary
reasons are reasons for not acting for certain reasons. Occasionally peo-
ple have such reasons. The easiest way to illustrate this is, as we saw
before, to imagine that someone promises not to act for certain reasons.
For example, Jane may promise to disregard her own interest when
advising a friend whether to leave USC for a job at Yale. Whatever
advice she would give will be based on all the considerations which bear
on the matter, except that one. If that promise is binding, then it consti-
tutes an exclusionary reason, a reason not to act for a certain other rea-
son. I can see no ground on which to fault the promise. It is easy to
imagine many circumstances in which it would be a very sensible prom-
ise. Even when it is rash or ill-advised, it does not seem to suffer from
any of the defects which render a promise invalid.
My example appears innocent enough, but appearances can be
deceptive. Could it be that the promise is invalid after all because it is a
promise to do something which may be a moral error to do? This seems
to be Moore's belief. He says that morality never "exclude[s] morally
compelling considerations from counting to determine the rightness of
keeping some promise or following some order. Morality never does this
because nothing can be excluded in the balance of objective reasons of
morality without leading to moral error." 2 I am assuming that in my
example Jane's interests will be significantly affected by her friend's deci-
sion, and that they are therefore "compelling moral reasons." What I
cannot see is how their exclusion may lead to moral error. I suspect it is
the other way round. Disregarding the promise will be a moral error, for
it commits the error Moore is worried about. It excludes a binding
promise from the moral balance.
We seem to be in a quandary. If no reason is to be excluded, then
certain promises, and other considerations, which if valid constitute
exclusionary reasons, must be denied any moral validity. On the other
hand, if these considerations are to be admitted as morally valid, then
other considerations will be excluded by them. This shows that Moore's
rejection of exclusionary reasons is an arbitrary choice of one side in a
symmetrical quandary.
Not that the quandary is particularly puzzling. Its basic features are
present in every conflict of reasons. After all, if one reason is more
important than another, and therefore outweighs it, the weaker reason is
22. Moore, supra note 4, at 872-73.
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not acted upon. We do not think that this is a moral error, for we under-
stand that to say that moral considerations are reasons for action is to
say that they should play their proper role in moral reasoning. They are
all presumptively sufficient to determine what ought to be done, that is,
other things being equal, they determine what ought to be done. But
other things are not always equal. There is no moral error in recognising
that a reason has been defeated, in some particular circumstances,
because of the presence of other, weightier reasons. Similarly, there is no
error in recognising that it has been excluded by an exclusionary reason.
Both times it makes sense both to say that it is a reason and that it does
not determine what is to be done.
This leaves the question, what is the difference between the two
ways of defeating reasons? What is the difference between reasons being
outweighed and being excluded? This is a crucial question. Without
answering it, talk of exclusionary reasons is incomprehensible. But it is a
different question from Moore's. His question accepts the intelligibility
of exclusionary reasons and challenges their validity. I have indicated
why I think the challenge fails.
It may, nevertheless, be useful to examine briefly the question of the
difference between the two types of conflict of reasons, the familiar one
and the one between an exclusionary reason and the reason it excludes.
Here is a familiar conflict. I'm hungry, but I'm due for a medical exami-
nation which can only be carried out on an empty stomach. I have a
reason to eat (now), and a reason not to eat (now). I cannot satisfy both.
If one is more important I should satisfy it. Now consider a different
case. Assume that it is wrong to eat in a hurry. One should always eat
slowly, in a measured way. This reason, one may say, partially conflicts
with any other reasons for eating. Certain ways of eating, certain ways of
satisfying the reasons for eating, violate it. But other ways of eating are
untouched. In such partial conflicts the question which is the more
important reason does not arise. Since one can satisfy both, one should
always do so.
In a similar way exclusionary reasons generate partial conflicts. The
reason, if there is one, not to eat for pleasure partially conflicts with
(first-order) reasons for eating. One can satisfy both, for one can eat
without eating for pleasure. (Notice that one can have pleasure in eating
even when one does not eat for pleasure.) That is why an exclusionary
reason always triumphs in such conflicts. It always excludes the first-
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order reasons it is aimed against. Ifp is a reason to A and q is an exclu-
sionary reason not to A for p the conflict between them is only a partial
one. Both can be satisfied if one does A for a reason other than p.
To be sure, conflicts involving exclusionary reasons are a special
kind of partial conflicts. They differ in important respects from ordinary
partial conflicts. For example, that eating is pleasurable is, let us agree, a
reason for eating. It is satisfied if I eat, for whatever reason. Suppose I
eat because I am hungry. My eating satisfies all the reasons for eating
that there are. Since, whatever the pleasure I actually derive from eating,
I do not eat for pleasure, I also comply with the reason I have not to eat
for pleasure. Note that the fact that eating is pleasurable is a first-order
reason. It is simply a reason to eat. It is to be distinguished from the
second-order reason that I may have to eat for pleasure. As Moore
notes, there can be conflict between two or more second-order reasons
and these will turn on weight. So if my reason is not a reason to eat but a
reason to eat for pleasure, it completely, and not merely partially, con-
flicts with the reason not to eat for pleasure, and the resolution of the
conflict turns on the respective weights of these reasons.23
These rather cryptic remarks point the way toward an explanation
of how conflicts between exclusionary and first-order reasons differ from
ordinary conflicts of first-order reasons, and why exclusionary reasons
always "win" in such conflicts regardless of weight. One way to put it is
to say that even if exclusionary reasons are admitted there is a sense in
which nothing is excluded, every valid consideration plays its role
(though of course not every reason "wins"). It is merely a matter of
structuring the reasons, of elucidating their proper interrelations, and
this involves the exclusion of some reasons by others.
D. THE MORAL REPUGNANCE OF EXCLUSIONARY REASONS
So far I have argued that exclusionary reasons occur from time to
time, that they are marked by giving a special structure to certain aspects
of our practical reasoning, and that they are not morally paradoxical.
Much of my previous writing was concerned with to show that exclu-
sionary reasons are crucial to our understanding of various familiar nor-
mative concepts, in particular promises, obligations, decisions, orders,
authority, certain rules (which I call mandatory rules), and normative
23. The same will be true if for some reason the conflict between the exclusionary reason and
the first-order reason is not a partial one but a head-on collision.
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powers. All these arguments are meant to show that promises, authorita-
tive directives, and the others structure our reasoning in the way that
exclusionary reasons do. This is their special function in our practical
deliberations.2"
Moore does not address any of these arguments, but he has a
detailed counter-argument to show that there cannot be any morally
valid exclusionary reasons.2" His argument takes the form of examples
which show that the law cannot be understood in that way, for if it is,
then it cannot be morally binding. At the very least, he must be taken to
argue that if I am right, then all legal systems are deeply morally flawed.
Since examples similar to his can be constructed to reach the conclusion
that, if I am right, then all authorities are illegitimate, all promises are
invalid, and so on, this is a far-reaching argument against my analysis.
The law, being a structure of authority, is, in my view, to be
explained in part by the prominence of exclusionary reasons in it. They
have a dual role, reflecting the fact that in an important way the law is a
double-tiered system of authority. First, it claims binding force to the
exclusion of certain contrary considerations. That is, while all legal sys-
tems allow certain moral defences and exceptions, they claim the right to
determine which moral defences and exceptions count, and necessarily
exclude some, namely those on the basis of which the law itself was
determined. Second, legal questions are subject to authoritative adjudi-
cation, since the law is a self-administering system. Once a case is
authoritatively decided, once it becomes res judicata, one has to conform
to that adjudication, even if it is mistaken in law. It is important to
remember that this is the only case in which the law systematically
excludes itself, that is, in which one legal decree excludes others.26 On
the first level of exclusion what is excluded (special cases aside) is not the
law but certain non-legal considerations. Some of Moore's examples,
which turn on judicial discretion to weigh various legal considerations
against each other, are irrelevant to this argument.27 This still leaves
24. See, e.g., J. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 49-84; J. RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 38-69.
25. Moore never objects to, and at times seems to accept the validity of, individual cases of
exclusionary reasons, such as the examples of promises not to act on one's own interests. His general
strategy of argument commits him to rejecting the validity of any exclusionary reasons, including
these. The mere fact that he can find nothing against these examples is enough to invalidate his
argument.
26. Once a judicial decision is res judicata it excludes other legal reasons under both the doc-
trines of res judicata and of collateral estoppel.
27. See Moore, supra note 4, at 869 n.129 (referring to United States v. Kirby, 74 U. S. (7
Wall.) 482 (1868)).
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much to be considered, including much about which I am uneasy.
Moore's argument is of the following form: If I am right, he says,
then the law cannot be morally binding. Since I regard the conclusion as
an open question, I find this argument, even if successful, not altogether
compelling.28 However, as I indicated above, if he is right, then it fol-
lows from my analysis that there are no binding promises, no legitimate
authorities, etc. So I cannot escape his argument by denying the legiti-
macy of the law. I doubt, however, whether the argument is successful.
I think that it fails regarding adjudication involving statutes, and since
this seems to me the simpler case I will start with it.
29
These are matters on which Moore has written extensively and
illuminatingly. Our disagreement on this occasion is rather narrow. We
need not inquire into the sort of considerations relevant for adjudication
involving statutes. We can assume agreement there. The question is of
the role of these considerations. My aim is to illustrate the sort of
account which is required to make sense of legislation so as to show that
it involves recognition of the role of exclusionary reasons, a role innocent
of moral objections. For example, certain decisions, while otherwise well
supported by reason, will be rejected in deference to considerations of
separation of powers.30 So far so good. The only question is what is the
role of this consideration. Is separation of powers a first-order reason, or
an exclusionary one? I think that typically, though perhaps not exclu-
sively, the doctrine of separation of powers claims the existence of exclu-
sionary reasons.
Imagine an income tax law which is sensitive both to levels of
income and to its sources, so that unearned income is taxed at a higher
28. Moore suggests that my views entail that there is a difference between the political obliga-
tions of ordinary citizens and of the courts. I do not think that they do. It is true that necessarily
"the courts are bound to apply [the law] regardless of their view of [its] merit," Moore, supra note 4,
at 835, but the same is true of ordinary citizens. Both courts and ordinary citizens are legally bound
to so act. Neither are necessarily morally so bound. Moore is right to say that I subscribe to the
common view that there are additional reasons for obeying the law which apply to judges, at least in
reasonably just societies. But I am not convinced that those amount to a binding moral obligation in
all cases. He suggests that the existence of an obligation to obey the law in a reasonably just society
is self-evident, and any analysis which doubts this should be rejected out of hand on that count. Id.
at 869. The point would have been more convincing had he confronted the various arguments that I,
and others, offered in support of our view. These arguments, by the way, do not rely on the exclu-
sionary force of the law.
29. It may be worth observing that Moore objects to the view that the law makes exclusionary
claims on the first tier. He says nothing about the claim that it is exclusionary on the second tier,
that is, in its doctrine of res judicata.
30. Here and in the following paragraphs I use "separation of powers" in its general sense
which is wider than its technical meaning in American constitutional law.
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rate than earned income, for the same level of income. Imagine that
someone claims that his tax is unjust, and that he is unfairly discrimi-
nated against, the fact that his income is unearned should be irrelevant to
his liability. In Britain his claim will be rejected. It is possible that vari-
ous legal systems have provisions for adjudicating such a claim on its
merits. All I am saying is that wherever there is a legal system based on
separation of powers it will exclude certain considerations from being
considered by the courts. So let's take this one as an example of the effect
of the principle of separation of powers.
Why does the separation of powers support differential taxation
according to source? There is nothing in the doctrine to show that it is
just to tax unearned income more heavily. The doctrine leads the court
to say something like this:
Since the issue of the justice of such a differentiation was clearly
decided upon by Parliament, we are precluded from examining the rea-
sons for or against it on their merits. There may be an injustice here,
but if so, it is not for us to put it right. We are excluded from subject-
ing the wisdom of Parliament's decision to our review.
So deferring to the authority of Parliament allows the admission of
exceptions which the courts may build into the law, but it is inconsistent
with their rejecting the basic rationale of the legislature's enactment.
Again, I am not claiming that this is the precise meaning of the
doctrine in English law, though it seems to me a reasonable first approxi-
mation. I am certainly not saying that this is how the doctrine must be
understood in every country. The name, "separation of powers," marks
a whole family of related doctrines, which vary greatly in detail, espe-
cially in the range of the exceptions allowing limited judicial modification
of statutory rules. But they all share the same structure. Whatever else
they may do, they all set exclusionary reasons for the considerations for
which courts may act.3
It is less clear to me whether the same is true of the binding force of
precedent. It seems clear to me that English law, at the very least until
31. At the risk of repeating an earlier point let me clarify my view once again. The surprising
thing about my explanation of separation of powers is not so much that it makes it include an
exclusionary reason as that it does not amount to much more. Why not say simply that the courts
have an overriding reason for not regarding the differential taxation as unjust. The answer is that the
separation of powers does not show that it is not unjust. Nor does it show that justice should not
prevail in cases of taxation. It merely addresses the question: Who should see that justice be done
when the allegation of injustice is based on this consideration? The reason why this consideration is
excluded from adjudication under this statute, while it may be available to the court on other occa-
sions, is that Parliament was here first, and has already adjudicated this particular question.
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the 1966 Practice Statement, that is, while it forbade the House of Lords
to overrule itself, included a strong exclusionary element. The reasoning
leading to this conclusion mimics the previous argument on the separa-
tion of powers doctrine. Today, the rule that the Court of Appeal may
not overrule itself, and generally the prohibition on lower courts overrul-
ing higher ones, indicates the existence of similar exclusionary elements
in the English Common Law. Beyond that, even today the House of
Lords is subject to an exclusionary reason to the effect that it should not
pursue every improvement but only clear ones. 32 Legal systems vary in
this matter. If Moore is right in arguing that any exclusionary rules lim-
iting the right of the courts to review precedents are morally indefensible,
then this part of the law is morally indefensible.
The problem I feel lies elsewhere. Must the House of Lords' power
to overrule precedents be subject to exclusionary reasons for the Com-
mon Law to be law? On the one hand, if they can change precedents
whenever the balance of reasons suggests that this would be best, then
they are not bound by them. All we can say is that they are bound by
reason. On the other hand, in that sense no legislature bound by its legis-
lation. Statutes are binding not because Parliament cannot change them,
but because ordinary people cannot. Besides, they are binding on Parlia-
ment until changed in accordance with due process of law. But is this
good enough when we turn from Parliament to the courts? We can, and
should, say that the courts make law. To that extent they are not bound
by precedent, since they can change it. But in what sense are they bound
if they can change it whenever it is relied upon? And if the courts are
never bound, in what sense are other people bound by the precedent if in
every case to which it applies people can challenge it in the courts?
My instinct is to say that the theoretical possibility is immaterial.
The practical difficulties in securing a judicial hearing, especially at the
highest level, are enough to give perfect sense to the notion of precedent
being binding on all, but subject to overruling (or distinguishing) by an
32. See J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 190 (1979), for the application of this point to the
House of Lords, and J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 62, for its general
relevance for the application of my explanation of authority. The point is further discussed below.
Moore is wrong to think that my position is like early Dworkin, see Moore, supra note 4, at 866.
Dworkin was advocating a moral view of what the law is and should be. I merely described certain
practices of the English Common Law. Dworkin was writing of how judges may overrule to over-
come legal mistakes and give effect to the correct legal position. I was describing what judges may
do in changing an existing law and making a new one. Finally, my criticism of Dworkin's early
writing, which applies to his later writing as well, was based on his endorsement of a coherence view
of how judges should decide cases, to which I am not committed. See Raz, Prof Dworkin's Theory of
Rights, 26 POL. STUD. 123 (1978).
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appropriate court. Many years ago I used this kind of argument to rebut
a parallel argument of John Austin's that the Sovereign cannot be bound
by law since it can always change it.33 If it is sound, and if a similar
argument can apply to precedent and the courts, then one need not insist
that precedent must set exclusionary barriers to overruling by at least
some courts. It remains true that it typically does set exclusionary rea-
sons limiting the grounds of review in some or even in all courts.
I am far from clear whether the reflections above refute Moore's
arguments in Part III of his paper. His argument is said to be addressed
against interpreting the law in terms of exclusionary reasons understood
in the first sense which he attributed to this term. Since I do not use
"exclusionary reasons" in that sense he may be criticizing views which I
do not hold, and we may have been arguing at cross purposes. But I
suspect that Moore is really arguing against my analysis in terms of
exclusionary reasons as I use the term. If so, I think that his argument
fails for a simple reason. He refuses to examine any of the points
repeated by me in the previous section above, which show that exclusion-
ary reasons may be sound. That is, that justice may require exclusion of
some reasons, rather than inclusion of all reasons in the judicial process
in order, for example, to give effect to participatory legislative democ-
racy, and to prevent judges from overriding it, or in order to establish
fairness and uniformity in the decisions of various courts by subjecting
them to binding precedents by superior courts, and other similar consid-
erations. The difference between us is not in our estimation of the rele-
vance or validity of factors of this kind. We may well agree on their
importance. But for Moore, if they are valid, it follows that they are
first-order reasons. He refuses to confront any of my arguments which
show that they are reasons of a special function and structure, that is,
exclusionary reasons.34
33. See J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 30 passim (2d ed. 1980).
34. This is particularly clear in Moore's observations. Moore, supra note 4, at 873-74. I
advanced numerous arguments which are meant to show that some reasons are exclusionary (that is,
the arguments about the structure of practical reasoning, the role of rules, decisions, authorities, etc.,
in such reasoning, and the arguments relating to the interrelations between the reasons for having
authorities, rules, promises, or decisions, and the reasons which these provide). Instead of con-
fronting any of these arguments, he is content with posing rhetorical questions: "R counted as a
good reason for action before the rule was passed, and it still counts as a good reason after the rule is
in place; how then could morality forbid actors to be motivated by R as they did A?" Id. Of course,
one should not equate what one has reason not to do with what one is forbidden to do, but even
when properly formulated a rhetorical question does not refute arguments.
In part, Moore blinds himself to the possible significance of exclusionary reasons by referring to
them continuously as reasons to be motivated in certain ways. This, while in a way true, can be
misleading. Exclusionary reasons address people's reasons for actions. Discourse of motives is most
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E. THE ALLEGED INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH
EXCLUSIONARY REASONS
After these technicalities it is a relief to turn to the grand arena of
the psychological presuppositions of practical reasoning. I think we can
avoid considering two general doctrines Moore relies upon. There is no
doubt that belief in reasons causes us to act. We often say, and we are
often right, that he did it because he believed that it would please his
mother, or that it would serve a good cause, or that he was under a duty
to so act, etc. Unlike Moore I do not regard this as a very significant
point. At least it is not a significant answer to any question. Rather, it
poses the question how to understand these causal statements. In what
ways do they resemble other causal statements, such as "the stone broke
the window," or "the heat caused the explosion?" I do not think, how-
ever, that anything we are concerned with depends on this.
As Moore half suspects, I am not a believer in "ought implies can,"
and not only for the reasons he indicates." I entirely agree, however,
that if it is impossible to comply with reasons to act for reasons, or with
reasons not to act for reasons, then it is absurd to suppose that there are
such reasons. Here we do touch on a central problem in philosophy.
Kant's moral philosophy, for example, is a much more important victim
of Moore's criticism. Kant thought that an action is of moral value only
if it is undertaken for the right reason, that is, out of respect for the
moral law. If Moore is right and second-order reasons cannot be com-
plied with, then according to Kant no action is of moral merit. But it is
surprising that anyone should doubt the possibility of complying with
such reasons. All that compliance requires is action for the specified rea-
sons, or (in the case of exclusionary reasons) not acting on specified rea-
sons. Since we do act for reasons, and since it is true that for many
intentional actions there are some specific reasons for which they were
taken and other reasons for which they were not taken, it is entirely pos-
sible to comply with second-order reasons.
36
at home when referring to emotions (revenge, envy, ambition). Reasons for action may, but need
not, be associated with emotions. It is a little odd to talk of my belief that Kiefer is a challenging
artist as my motive for going to an exhibition of his work, or of my appointment to meet a student at
11 a.m. as my motive for hurrying back to the University.
35. See, eg., J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15 (on moral dilemmas).
36. It is important here that we regularly act for reasons. It is not simply something that
happens as a fluke once in a while.
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Moore understands his objection as requiring a higher standard. It
requires not only the possibility of compliance, but the existence of con-
trol over whether one complies or not.37 Moore rests his case on two
claims. Both are encompassed by the statement "we cannot choose the
reasons on which we act."'38 First, he says that "[r]easons are not among
the possible objects of our willing.",39 Second, "we cannot make some-
thing be our motive for the same reason that we cannot manufacture a
causal relation between solar flares and cancer."'  Moore is talking here
about what he calls "subjective reasons" these are our beliefs in the exist-
ence of reasons. So the first statement is not that we cannot make need,
or justice, or the avoidance of danger, be or not be a reason for action.
Of course we cannot. Either they are or they are not, but that is not
Moore's point. He states that we cannot choose what reasons. The sec-
ond statement adds to this that once we have a belief we cannot choose to
make it the cause of our action.
In the main I tend to agree with both claims, but how do they bear
on the case for or against exclusionary reasons? The statements are
meant to show that second-order reasons cannot be complied with. The
argument fails for it assumes that what you cannot choose you cannot
do. But from the fact that one cannot choose one's beliefs it does not
follow that one cannot believe. As we saw, however, this would not sat-
isfy Moore. His objection is not that we cannot comply with second-
order reasons but that we have no control over whether we comply or
not. Sometimes we do, sometimes we do not, but it is not up to us
whether or not we do. Since we cannot choose what to believe, nor can
we choose what our beliefs will cause, it is not up to us whether we com-
ply with second-order reasons or not, and there is something odd about
that.
I fear that this objection fails. It misunderstands the nature of
choice and therefore concludes that what we cannot choose we cannot
control. Whatever else is true of choice it seems to me to include the
following two ideas. First, to choose to do, etc., is to be set to do, etc.
Second, choice is an expression of one's will. One's will is determined to
do the chosen act. This is very vague, and there is little I can do to
explain it here. If we use the metaphor of the contrast between the inter-
nal and the external, one can say that choosing indicates that by one's
37. See his rejection of the weak sense of "can." Moore, supra note 4, at 875-76.
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will all that is internally required for the action has happened. That is
what I meant by saying that one is set to act. If one does not then act,
the failure is not in the internal, not in the self. One's limbs may have
failed one, or luck may have frustrated the attempt, or the like.4"
This explains why one cannot normally choose to believe in a propo-
sition, nor choose to want to eat, nor choose to like eating, etc. I cannot
choose to believe not because what I believe is beyond my control, but
because it is not subject to my will but to my intellect.42 My intellect
controls what I believe in by its own methods. I check the evidence,
evaluate it carefully, look for more, and so on. That my intellect is not
subject to my will does not show that it is not under control. On the
contrary, it shows that it is properly under my control. It is when the
will interferes with my intellect that I lose control over myself. Notice
that the expression "I (he) chose to believe him" implies some bad faith,
self-deception, rationalization, or some other cognitive defect.
I cannot choose to want something, or to like something or some-
body, even though choosing and liking are manifestations of the will.
The reason is that choosing means that one is set to do it. It does not
normally entail that one did it, for external factors may have foiled one.
With wanting and liking there are no external factors. To say that one is
set to like or to want is to say that one wants or likes. There is no gap
between the being set and the wanting or liking. Hence, there is no room
for the idea of choosing. Its function is to mark the internal determina-
tion of the will, but the internal determination of the will to want or to
like is that wanting or liking. Again, the inability to choose to want or to
like is not a contingent empirical inability. It is a logical or conceptual
one. It does not mark a failure of self-control. It simply indicates a dif-
ference in the mode of its exercise.
I am not saying, of course, that we always like or want what we
want to like or want. Our self-control is not complete. Sometimes when
we are not internally set to want something (that is, when we do not want
it), but we either want to want it or realise that we ought to want it, we
can set about training ourselves to want it, or manipulating our desires to
make us want it. But the fact that our control is incomplete does not
mean that we have no control. The only issue we are concerned with is
to rebut the objection that we have no control over whether we comply
41. I am leaving aside choices which take place some time before the action.
42. This is far too sweeping since, within certain limits, what I believe is subject to my will.
The cognitive reasons for belief or disbelief are often indeterminate. In these cases the reasons why I
do not normally choose to believe are those which explain why I do not choose to want something.
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with second-order reasons. Sometimes we do, sometimes we do not, but
it is not up to us whether or not we do. Compliance, according to this
objection, is not something we do. It merely happens to us. This I hope
to have refuted at least in so far as the objection rests on Moore's first
proposition, namely that we cannot choose our beliefs and desires. Can
it rest on the second proposition? Given that we have control over what
we believe and what we will, can we choose which of our beliefs will
cause our actions, for nothing less than that is required if compliance
with second-order reasons is not something that merely happens to us.
Again, we cannot choose but we can control. Our control of what
causes our actions is our control over our beliefs. For while I cannot
make my belief that all things considered, this is what I ought to do cause
me to do this, it is the case that the belief will, barring irrational factors
and external obstacles, so cause me to act.43 My control over what
causes me to act is, therefore, my control over what I take to justify the
conclusion that, all things considered, that is what I should do. It is the
process of reasoning which leads me to appreciate the force of various
considerations, and to conclude which of them should determine my
action. By coming to believe that my duty to my brother justifies the
conclusion that when all is said and done I should accede to his request, I
"make" that belief the cause of my action. So the objection which is
based on Moore's two statements fails.
In concluding, I have to admit that I feel uneasy every time I men-
tion "control." I suppose what I am really after are the sources of the
distinction between activity and passivity with regard to our own self.
Our thoughts and desires belong to the active side, and are unlike obses-
sions, compulsions, various forms of irrationality, and those of our pas-
sions which possess us. I do not know how to explain this distinction,
but I have no doubt of its importance. Second-order reasons are suspect
if conformity with them is a matter in which we are passive and impacted
upon, rather than active.
I have given my reasons for thinking that we are active in those
matters, that they are generally under our (partial) control. The crucial
point there was the recognition that control is manifested in different
ways in different matters. In particular, when we reach for the core, for
our control of the will and the intellect, the familiar Kantian insight
43. I am not suggesting that every practical question is resolved by reasons indicating which is
the best or the right action. Many practical questions are not so determined. But those do not
concern us here.
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applies: Control is in submission to the laws of rationality rather than in
the absence of any shackles.
F. GENERALISING EXCLUSIONARY REASONS
Perry suggests that exclusionary reasons can be seen as a special
case of a wider range of second-order reasons, which he calls weighting
reasons. They are reasons to give first-order reasons a weight which dif-
fers from the one the agent would otherwise judge them to possess."
"Subjective" exclusionary reasons are reasons to assign zero weight to
first-order reasons.45 As we saw earlier, I do not use the notion of a
"subjective" exclusionary reason. This does not mean that Perry's
notion of weighting reasons is not a useful one. Bringing Perry's notion
into line with my earlier argument that reasons for action are facts rather
than beliefs about them, I take his notion of a weighting reason to mean
the following: Certain facts are reasons for assigning other facts, which
are reasons for action, a greater or lesser weight than they would other-
wise merit.
In Practical Reasons and Norms I considered the role of weight-
affecting considerations.46 For example, the fact that a friend's husband
and children are away gives extra weight to the reason I have to visit her
in hospital. Perry's reweighting reasons are different. They do not affect
the "true" weight of the first-order reasons. They merely require agents
to act as if they had a particular weight, regardless of the weight they
really have. As Perry notes, the notion may be useful in discussing
presumptions.
Perry makes a further suggestion which concerns the grounds for, or
the conditions of applicability of, exclusionary reasons and presumably of
all reweighting reasons. He calls them epistemic limitations. Perry's
point amounts to the following: Sometimes the grounds which justify
not acting on certain reasons have to do with the agent's epistemic state.
For example, he may have reason to exclude certain reasons from his
considerations (and, let us say, defer to the opinion of another) only if he
is uncertain about the import of those considerations. But he has no
reason to exclude any reason if he is clear in his own mind what their
44. Perry, supra note 2, at 932.
45. Id.
46. J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15,,at 35.
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impact is on the balance of reasons. Perry calls such reasons "epistemi-
cally bounded" reasons. a7 As these remarks make clear, they are a spe-
cies of exclusionary (and of all weighting) reasons. Perry mistakenly
regards them as a distinct type of reason. But, as he half recognises, they
are not, they are really very similar to various species of exclusionary
reasons which I specifically discuss. Most importantly, they are rather
like exclusionary reasons grounded in considerations which show that
the agent's own judgment is less reliable than that of the alleged author-
ity. I myself tend to regard Perry's epistemically-bounded reasons as just
such reasons, with the agent's uncertainty about the impact of various
considerations being merely the ground for thinking that the authority's
judgment is more reliable.
Perry's reason for thinking that his epistemically-bounded reasons
are not exclusionary ones is that they do not fulfill the function that I
assigned to exclusionary reasons. This if true shows that I was wrong
about the function of some exclusionary reasons. It does not lend any
credence to the view that epistemically-bounded reasons are not exclu-
sionary. My mistake' was to have claimed that valid mandatory rules,
including authoritative ones, can be applied independently of the reasons
for them. But Perry's epistemically-bounded reasons can be applied
independently of the background reasons for their validity. All he has
shown is that their validity cannot be established independently of such
background considerations. But this was never in doubt. Later on we
shall see that Moore argues that none of what I take to be legally binding
exclusionary reasons can be applied without regard to their background
justification. Perry, however, does not claim that.
II. ON LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
A. ITS NORMAL JUSTIFICATION
I have claimed (under the title "The Normal Justification Thesis")
that the normal and primary argument for the justification of authority
must show that conforming to its directives is more likely to lead one to
conform better with reason than acting independently of it would.49
Perry thinks that this leaves out of account considerations of the condi-
tions for an efficient operation of authoritative institutions." But the
47. Perry, supra note 2, at 942.
48. See id. at 943.
49. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 53-57.
50. Perry, supra note 2, at 897, 939-40.
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normal justification thesis is abstract enough to include such factors."1
The reason is simple. An efficient institution may be able to perform in a
way which makes compliance with its directives closer to reason than
either compliance with a less efficient institution or acting independently.
Morigiwa also finds the normal justification thesis too narrow. But
this is due, I think, at least in part, to three misunderstandings of my
view. First, even more than Perry, he thinks that in my view superior
knowledge is the only possible justification of authority.52 Second, he
mistakenly identifies my discussion of authority and of law in terms of
reasons for action with moral reasons, when this term is narrowly con-
strued. Reasons range from the humblest to the sublime, from the need
to have some fresh air to the desirability of having a rich and fulfilling
life, from concern with one's hairdo to concern for the victims of mass
starvation. Third, Morigiwa identifies acting for a reason with action
following conscious rational deliberation. In my view, people can inter-
nalise reasons and act on them automatically and instinctively. Once
understood in these ways, my analysis of authority and law is seen to be
free from some of the defects to which he objects.
One point where my account of justification of authority was at fault
is in not emphasizing enough the value, to some people on some occa-
sions, of not having to decide for themselves. The costs of decision in
time, labor, mental energy, and anxiety are often considerable. Being
able to spare them is often worth paying for, even through reduced suc-
cess in conforming with reason.
I did, of course, take account of the reverse of this factor. I made
clear that compliance with the normal justification is not sufficient for the
legitimacy of an authority. One needs also to show that there are no
defeating contrary reasons. I mentioned in particular the need to satisfy
what Green calls "The Condition of Autonomy," that is, that the matter
(over which someone is said to have authority) is not one on which it is
more important that people should decide for themselves than that they
should decide correctly. 3 This is meant to take account of "the intrinsic
desirability of people conducting their own life by their own lights."54
51. They are briefly discussed in J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 51-
52.
52. Cf. Morigiwa, Authority, Rationality, and Law: Joseph Raz and the Practice of Law, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 897, 903-05 (1989).
53. Green, Law, Legitimacy and Consent, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 795, 810 (1989).
54. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 57.
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"The case for the validity of a claim to authority must include justifica-
tory considerations sufficient to outweigh such counter-reasons.""5 If
both the normal justification thesis and the condition of autonomy are
fulfilled then, in general, the alleged authority is legitimate.56 Green
agrees that these form necessary conditions for the legitimacy of an
authority. But he thinks that they are not sufficient and they become
sufficient only if the subject of the authority consented to be subject to it.
I will consider the role of consent below. Let me first defend my claim
that the two conditions specified are, normally, sufficient. He argues
against this conclusion through an analogy:
Suppose Carol is an excellent investment counselor and that conform-
ity to her advice is certain to be optimal. Suppose further that there is
no intrinsic value in David managing his own financial affairs. Does
that show that Carol has legitimate authority to act for David? No.
Although it does show if she were given such authority she would be
justified in having it, it also shows that David would be justified in
giving it to her. Why should we think that a government is in a differ-
ent position? 7
Authority to act for someone is authority in a slightly different sense
of the term. It means being permitted to act in a certain way by someone
with normative power to grant such permissions or authorizations.5 I
will disregard that aspect of Green's example and treat it as a discussion
of authority over people, by assuming that Carol tells David what to do,
rather than that she does it for him. Is he bound by her advice?
I agree with Green that the government is in the same position. We
can further agree that under the conditions described Carol has no
authority to manage David's financial affairs. But has the example estab-
lished that the two conditions are met? It asserted that the first condition
is satisfied. How about the second? All we are told is that "there is no
intrinsic value in David managing his own financial affairs." 59 But, as
Green says, that fact "does not show that there is no intrinsic value in
deciding for himself whether or not to do so."6 Presumably Green is
alleging that my condition "that it is more important that David should
55. Id.
56. The reason for not saying that the normal justification thesis and the condition of auton-
omy together constitute a sufficient condition for the legitimacy of an authority is that there may be
other reasons against holding it legitimate. In this respect the passage cited by Green, supra note 53,
at 808-09, is imprecise.
57. Id. at 811.
58. See J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 28-33.
59. See Green, supra note 53, at 811.
60. Id.
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decide for himself than that he should decide correctly" means only that
it is more important that he should decide for himself whether to buy
stocks or to sell them, but not that it is important that he should decide
for himself how to handle his financial affairs, for example, by reading
the financial papers, getting daily advice from Carol, or putting her in
charge.61 This was not my meaning, and I agree with him that the condi-
tion of autonomy must bear the wider of the two interpretations. Here is
the way I tried to ward off such misunderstandings in The Morality of
Freedom:
Since this chapter is meant as a normative-explanatory account of
the core notion of authority, it can be extended to explain reference to
authority in various specific contexts. But such extensions are neither
mechanical nor automatic. For example .... [h]ow does it help to
understand discourse of someone being an authority?... Consider as
an example cases where a person ... is said to be an authority on a
certain matter, as in 'John is an authority on Chinese cooking' or
'Ruth is an authority on the stock exchange.' Neither John nor Ruth
has authority over me, even though my Chinese cooking and my finan-
cial affairs will prosper if I follow their advice rather than trust my
own judgment.
... They do not have authority over me because the right way to
treat their advice depends on my goals.... Here the normal justifica-
tion thesis establishes the credentials of John and Ruth as authorities
in their fields. But whether or not there is a complete justification for
me to regard their advice or instructions as guides to my conduct in
the way I regard a binding authoritative directive depends on my other
goals. In such cases while talking of a person as being an authority,
one refrains from talking of him as in authority over one.
62
As this passage makes clear, where the autonomy condition is not
met we do not talk of people as being in authority over us. This remains
the case even if we decide to be guided by authorities rather than to fol-
low our own judgment on the merits of each case. It is true enough that
bodies with general authority over us, such as governments may have,
are the exception to this rule. Where our decision not to be guided by
our own judgment on the merit of the case is a condition of governmental
authority over us, in accord with the autonomy condition, then we speak
of governmental authority when that condition (and all others) is met.
61. See id.
62. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 64.
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Sometimes the granting of consent may be a way for meeting the
condition of autonomy. This point suggests that Green is right in alleg-
ing that I underplayed the importance of consent as a condition of
authority. I have concentrated on consent as the positive ground for
authority, and I was particularly concerned with arguments which may
show that political authorities, at least sometimes, have the authority
which they claim to possess. But consent can also play a modest role in
removing an objection to a limited authority. There are matters over
which it is more important to decide correctly than to decide for oneself.
In other matters, the importance of deciding for oneself overrides all
other considerations. But in between there are areas where it is an
optional good for a person to decide for himself. In such matters consent
serves to establish authority. But this type of argument will never be
enough to establish the authority that the modern state claims to itself,
nor, as Green admits, will it dispense with the role of the normal justifi-
cation as the way of establishing the main reason for authority, without
which consent would not be binding.
B. INDICATOR RULES AND AUTHORITY
Professor Regan agrees with much that I say about authority but
thinks that I aspire to a more substantial notion of authority than my
account warrants. To show this he advances his own account, which he
calls the indicator rule account of authority. Indicator rules are Regan's
elucidation of what are colloquially known as rules of thumb.6 3 The view
that Regan favours is that a person has authority if and only if there is
(given the current state of knowledge) a justified rule of thumb to the
effect that he should be obeyed. Such a rule can be justified on grounds
that following it will save time or avoid the problems of incomplete infor-
mation, or of bias.
I agree that rules of thumb can provide justification for some people
or organizations having limited authority over some people. As Regan
points out, the rule of thumb justification, where it is available, meets the
three theses about the nature of authority that form my account of the
concept of legitimate authority. The analysis provided there shows
clearly that rules of thumb can provide justification for authority. Also,
63. I think that all the features mentioned by Regan as distinguishing his "indicator rules"
from rules of thumb do in fact apply to rules of thumb, except that some rules of thumb are infallible
(e.g., the rule that a number is divisible by 9 if the sum of its digits is divisible by 9. See Regan,
Authority in Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 995, 1004 (1989).
Notice, however, that even infallible rules of thumb are revisable in the sense that it may turn out
that there are better alternative rules to follow as guides to such solutions. See infra note 70.
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as Regan notes, the argument of Chapter 4 of The Morality of Freedom
concerning the authority of the state conforms in many respects to his
view as explained in the present article and in his Law's Halo.'4 The
main theoretical difference between us concerns the best way to under-
stand the role of authority in initiating and maintaining coordinative
practices. I will consider this issue, in which Regan seems to join forces
with Green, later. First we need to clarify some minor conceptual mis-
understandings which create the impression that Regan and I disagree
when, once the confusions are out of the way, we do not.
My discussion of authority in The Morality of Freedom falls into two
parts. 5 Chapter Three provides an account of the concept of practical
authority. It applies to parental authority, divine authority, the author-
ity of football coaches, teachers, and all other cases of authority, or
claimed authority, in our societies as well as in others. Chapter Four
utilizes that account to offer some arguments concerning the authority of
the modern state. Some of Regan's gentle dissatisfaction with my treat-
ment of the subject results from his failure to take notice of this fact. It is
essential for an explanation of the concept of authority to recognise that
people who do not accept the agent-neutral consequentialist view which
Regan favours do share the same concept, and use it cogently, even if
they may hold mistaken views as to who has legitimate authority and
who does not. The account of the concept may not be committed to,
though it should be compatible with, agent-neutral consequentialism.
The wavering that he chides me for in this regard, as well as that con-
cerning the question whether a clear mistake puts a directive outside the
jurisdiction of the authority, is no wavering at all. I was putting forward
an account which explains a concept used by people holding different
views on these issues. To make it a good account I had to recognise that,
and avoid any explanation that takes sides on these issues.66
In other words, to succeed, such an account must provide the frame-
work for arguments about the justification of authority, its duties, and
the duties of the subject towards it. But it should leave the actual filling-
in of the arguments to further, more substantial stages in the argument.
In my case, since the book is concerned with the authority of states only,
64. Regan, Law's Halo, in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 15 (J. Coleman and E.F. Paul eds. 1987).
65. Three, if the critical and preliminary analysis of Chapter Two is included.
66. As to the question whether my view is a consequentialist one or not the position I took in
the book was that successive refinements of the notion of consequentialism have left almost bereft of
all content and made it an unrewarding tool of analysis or clarification. The fact that Regan con-
gratulates me for being a consequentialist even though I rightly reject most theses supported by
consequentialists only strengthens this belief.
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the filling-in comes with the argument of Chapter Four. Regan's com-
plaint that I do not really argue for the normal justification thesis shows
a similar misunderstanding. No full-fledged moral argument is called for
at this stage. What is required, and what I attempted to provide, is an
account which shows how various features of authority hang together
(the service conception), how they are free from objections, and how they
capture the most important features of the concept as we know it (this
last task necessarily relies largely on pointing to what every reader
knows).67
For myself, I find Regan's neglect of the distinction between an
explanation of the notion of authority and a complete moral argument
about the conditions under which anyone has legitimate authority puz-
zling. Is his account meant to be an account of the concept? I think it
hardly qualifies as such because it takes a partisan consequentialist view,
which disqualifies it as an account of the concept of authority used by
Kantians and others, as well as by consequentialists. As I already
acknowledged, Regan's account when duly fleshed out provides a (pre-
sumptively68) sufficient condition for the legitimacy of practical author-
ity. Regan argues that there cannot be a justification of authority on any
other grounds because (1) whatever role authorities may play in the gen-
eration of solutions to coordination problems (or prisoners' dilemmas,
etc.) they do not, in doing so, function as authorities (though their suc-
cess may depend on the fact that they are on other occasions or for other
purposes authorities); (2) my non-instrumental arguments for the justifi-
cation of authority are flawed.
Before I consider these arguments, let me note that in one respect
Regan is unjust to his own account. He says that it does not justify talk-
ing of obedience to authority, nor of the legitimacy of authority since we
do not obey rules of thumb, nor do we talk of them as legitimate. But
these observations, though true, do not support his conclusion. It is not
the rule of thumb which is to be obeyed or to be held legitimate. It is the
authority. The rule of thumb is the rule that X is a legitimate authority
in matters such as... or that there is a duty to obey X .... or that Xs
directives are binding .... If we follow the rule, we obey the authority,
and hold it to be legitimate. If the rule of thumb is to be followed, we
ought to obey the authority, and it is legitimate.
67. On the strategy of the explanation I used see J. RAz, THE MORALrrY OF FREEDOM, supra
note 15, at 63, 165.
68. That is, it is sufficient, other things being equal.
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It is just as well that Regan has, I believe, slipped on this point. If
his account fails here, if it cannot explain why we regard justified author-
ity as binding, or as imposing obligations, or as legitimate, then it would
not be an account of authority. Regan's cavalier comment that we need
not regard authorities as legitimate or as imposing obligations misses the
point. We have no choice in the matter. It is of the essence of justified
authorities that they are legitimate, and that they impose obligations. To
fail to see that is to fail to understand the concept of authority.6 9
Regan believes that I reject the rule of thumb account of authority
7 1
As I have just explained, I do, and I do not. I do reject it as an account
of the concept of authority, and I see no reason to regard it as a necessary
condition for the legitimacy of authority. But it has the kernel of an
account of a presumptively sufficient condition for the legitimacy of some
authorities. Regan's reasons for attributing to me a negative attitude to
his account are, however, mistaken. He identifies his own account with
the recognition conception of authority which I criticized.71 Here again I
think that Regan is making a mistake which does an injustice to his own
view.72 It accounts for his, to my mind mistaken, belief that the rule of
thumb account cannot explain the role of authorities in coordinating
behaviour. Rules of thumb, which are, let me repeat, among other
things, exclusionary reasons, can justify authorities on the ground that
they are useful in coordinating behaviour. In other words, in appropriate
circumstances my best rule of thumb is to do what X tells me to do,
because following his directives seems most likely to secure desirable
coordination. Of course, such a rule is, according to Regan, a rule of
thumb only if its adoption is justified by reference to the incompleteness
69. The point is argued in Chapter Two of THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM.
70. This statement is not entirely accurate. Strictly speaking Regan thinks that I reject the
indicator rule account of authority. I believe that rules of thumb are not indicator rules. I believe
that rules of thumb are exclusionary reasons. Indicator rules are not. They are rules for not consid-
ering certain reasons. As explained in Section I.B. above such reasons are not exclusionary reasons,
and they are not part of an explanation of authority. See also J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREE-
DOM, supra note 15, at 23-35, where I considered and criticized Hart's explanation of authority in
terms of reasons for not considering certain reasons; J. RAz, PRACTICAL NORMS AND REASON
supra note 2, at 59-62, I argued that rules of thumb provide exclusionary reasons for action. For this
reason I discuss rules of thumb directly, rather than Regan's "indicator rules." I think that all the
views concerning rules of thumb which I attribute to him are views which he holds.
71. This criticism is found in Chapter Two of THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM. Regan is unsure
of this identification. See Regan, supra note 63, at 1019 n.57.




of one's information or to the need to avoid bias or to save time. Some-
times such factors will figure in the justification. The following is (a
sketch of) an example:
When I have to decide what to do on matters I do not have the time or
the information to decide what course of action has salience and would
form the solution to the coordination problem. If I always follow X's
directives I am much more likely to do what everybody else will do
than if I trust my judgement in those circumstances, especially if, as is
likely, other people will do the same.
Sometimes rules justifying authority, that is, rules that one person
should obey another, are justified not by such factors but by the desire to
avoid the psychological anxiety of deciding for oneself on each occasion,
or to save the mental energy involved. But such and similar factors
should be added to Regan's over restrictive list of the grounds the pres-
ence of which qualifies a rule as a rule of thumb. My point is simply that
all these reasons may combine with reasons for achieving coordination,
just as they can combine with reasons for avoiding toxic toys and the
like, to justify authority. I am not suggesting, of course, that all author-
ity-legimating rules which are based on reasons of coordination are rules
of thumb. Only that some are. So these observations do not solve the
main difficulty that Regan is dealing with. The question is what more
need be said about the role of authority in securing coordination.
C. COORDINATION AND AUTHORITY
We are now ready to consider Regan's main argument. Regan's
point is simple and powerful. He agrees that authoritative directives can
play a crucial role in securing coordination. By, let us say, passing a law
requiring a certain course of action, which is one of several possible solu-
tions to a many-person coordination problem, the legislature makes that
solution the salient one, and secures its adoption by the population,
which is only too eager to adopt any solution likely to be adopted by
everyone. But, insists Regan, it is the salience of the solution, rather than
the fact that it was made legally obligatory, which is people's reason for
following it. The law serves its role in creating salience. But it does not
function as an authoritative directive which has to be recognised itself as
a reason for action. The need to secure coordination can never justify
regarding the law itself as a reason for action. All it can ever be, where
coordination is concerned, is the cause of salience.73
73. Some elements of the argument were in a much cruder form anticipated and endorsed by
me in Chapter 12 of THa AUTHORITY OF LAW. The following discussion indicates also where I
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I think that Regan's argument will strike most people as counter-
intuitive for one simple reason. They will rightly observe that the law
endows the course of action it requires with salience precisely because it
is recognised as authoritative by the population. Regan is aware that
something like this response is likely and tries to get around it. I think
that he fails. One cannot argue that it is legislature's authority on other
matters enables this statute to make the action it (illegitimately) requires
salient. If people believed that the authority is exceeding its legitimate
powers in passing this statute, they would be likely to resent it, and
would prefer not to follow it. It would acquire, if you like, negative sali-
ence. This is at least a likely outcome, and this would be enough to dis-
courage the authority from trying to solve coordination problems in this
way. The fact is, of course, that the prescribed conduct becomes the
salient solution because people assume that the authority was within its
rights in passing the statute, and that is why each one expects the others
to obey it. Still, it is not clear whether there is here an answer to Regan's
argument. 74
Consider, for example, my position. I am faced with a coordination
problem. I discover that because of other people's belief in the legitimacy
of the legislature, a particular course of action, which is in fact a solution
to the coordination problem, will be followed. So I follow it just because
of that. I do not accept the legitimacy of the authority, nor need I do so.
I simply rely on a prediction as to how other people will behave. The
fact that the prediction is based on my knowledge of their belief in the
legitimacy of the authority of the legislature is neither here nor there. It
does not show that the legislature has authority over me, that is, that I
ought to do as the statute prescribes because it was duly enacted, rather
than because it is likely to be followed by others.
This line of argument may suggest that I am free-riding, in a rather
special way. I am a cognitive free-rider. In fact, everyone is in my posi-
tion and can reason similarly. But if all, or many, did, and if this became
generally known, then the authority will lose its ability to secure coordi-
nation. If my views were generally shared, and were known to be shared,
no one would be able to reason as I now do, for the premise of my argu-
ment would then be false. In other words, my beliefs are collectively self-
think the argument there fails to take account of all the relevant considerations. It is also intended
as at least a partial reply to the related argument advanced with great subtlety by Professor L. Green
in previous publications. See Green, Authority and Convention, 35 PHIL. Q. 329 (1985); Green, Law,
Co-ordination and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1983).
74. My following observations may capture the way that Regan intended his own rebuttal of
this counter-argument to be understood, but I am not sure of that.
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defeating.7" This may count against my belief. It is arguable that to
show that a normative or evaluative belief is collectively self-defeating is
to provide a sort of reductio ad absurdum argument against it. I do not
wish to pursue this line of argument any further, for whatever its merits
it falls short of what is required to show that authority can rest on the
need to secure coordination. Two reasons show the inadequacy of the
argument. First, at best the argument shows the legitimacy of the
authority to set up new schemes of coordination. At the beginning the
statute, one may say, is binding because it gives hope that coordination
will emerge. But after a while the statute ceases to matter. If a coordina-
tive practice emerged, then one ought to conform for that reason, regard-
less of whether the statute is still in force. If a coordinative practice
failed for some reason to emerge, then one has no reason to follow the
statute, for it will now be likely that it simply failed, and that it lost its
chance to motivate the emergence of a coordinative practice.76 The sec-
ond way the previous argument fails to establish the legitimacy of the
authority is that it merely establishes that its directive is an ordinary
reason for action. It fails to establish that it is a pre-emptive reason. But
authoritative directives are pre-emptive reasons. This point is the back-
bone of Green's argument alluded to above. Regan, who agrees that
authoritative directives are pre-emptive, would agree with the point.
I have written briefly in the past that arguments such as Green's and
Regan's apply only to coordination problems as defined in game theory,
but that is an artificially narrow sense of the term. My claim that author-
ities can be justified by their help in securing coordination is not meant to
refer to this technical sense of the term.77 Securing coordination means
just that. It means getting people to act in ways which are sensitive to
the way others are guided, or are likely, to act so that benefits can then be
expected which are less likely if people act without coordinating their
efforts, that is, without basing their own actions on a view as to how
others should or are likely to act. Coordination presupposes that people
are not trying to fail one another. Rather, they are trying to secure goals
which are shared by all, or perhaps just goals that all should have. But
coordination does not presuppose that every participant will improve his
position by coordinating. People can coordinate in attempting to rescue
75. See D. PARFIT, PERSONS AND REASONS (1984), on the notion of beliefs which are collec-
tively self-defeating.
76. This, broadly speaking, was the view I adopted in Chapter 12 of THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW. The argument needs refining to account for different probable development in varying
circumstances.
77. Though I admit that at times I wrote in ways which encourage that mistake.
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the victims of a natural disaster, though they do so at a great cost to
themselves. The prospect that coordinative practices will emerge auto-
matically, which is held out by game theory, is less than compelling given
that the need to secure coordination is not the same as the need to solve
game-theoretical recurring multi-person coordination problems.
Let me comment briefly on the reasons which can establish the
desirability of social coordination in this wider sense. They arise from
two sources. First, without a coordinated effort, some good, which can
in principle be secured at an acceptable cost, will be lost. Second, some-
times the good need not be lost. It can be secured through the contribu-
tion of a smaller number of people, but it would be unjust to impose the
full burden of securing the good on those people rather than on a larger
group. This last point may suggest to some that I am confusing coordi-
nation problems with the free rider problem in the provision of public
goods. But remember that I do not have in mind only what game theory
dubs coordination problems. Nor do I have in mind only the provision
of public goods. Coordination may be necessary to secure the protection
of an endangered species, or of a natural wilderness. Their protection
need not be thought of as a good to anyone. It may be a good in itself.
But the coordinated effort, or the contribution required for it, arises out
of the two reasons I mentioned. Without the coordination, either the
goal will not be achieved, or if achieved it will be secured through some
individuals carrying more than their fair share of the burden, while
others contribute nothing or less than they should, or even stand in the
way of the goal by their behaviour, which may positively increase the
danger to the endangered species or to the environment.
The common ways of defining coordination problems in game the-
ory can be adapted to include cases in which people have non-self-inter-
ested reasons for securing goals requiring coordination with others. But
they cannot be extended to encompass another way in which our ordi-
nary notion of a coordination problem differs from the game-theoretical
one. The game-theoretical notion is essentially subjective. That is, for a
coordination problem to exists it is not enough that people's reasons indi-
cate that there are several courses of action each of which will be the best
if adopted by. all others. A coordination problem exists only if people
generally are (1) aware of the structure of their reasons; (2) aware of the
courses of action which, if generally followed, will lead to the desired
result; (3) aware that the same is true of other people's reasons; and (4)
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aware that it is generally known that all four conditions (that is, the pre-
vious three and this one) are met. According to the sense of "coordina-
tion" in common discourse, coordination problems exist whenever the
reasons which apply to people are such that they would do best if they
act in a coordinated way. The subjective conditions (1) to (4) are not
part of the problem, but commonly, part of its solution. That is, the
problem is to get people to realise that they are confronting a coordina-
tion problem and, once this is achieved, to get them to realise that it is
common knowledge that there is a coordination problem, and that it is
common knowledge that it is common knowledge.
Needless to say, the fact that coordination problems arise not only
when people can best satisfy their own preferences by coordinating with
others, but also when they can only secure the morally best outcome by
coordinating with others, increases considerably the possibility that they
will fail to realise that they face a coordination problem, and even if they
do, they will doubt whether this understanding is common. But quite
apart from this consideration there is a big gap between the existence of a
coordination problem in the common (objective) sense and the existence
of a coordination problem in the game-theoretical (subjective) sense.
Once the subjective conditions are met the most difficult part of solving
the problem is over. Indeed, on many occasions once the subjective con-
ditions are met no problem remains. On many occasions there is only
one course of action which will secure, if generally followed, the desired
result. Barring irrationality, forgetfulness, etc., it will be followed if the
subjective conditions are met. To salvage a problem out of its definition,
game theory includes a further condition in the definition of a coordina-
tion problem. There is such a problem only if there are several possible
equilibrium points, that is, several different courses of action, each of
which will be best if generally followed. The only problem that game
theory identified as a coordination problem is choosing which course of
conduct one should follow under those conditions.
Our common understanding of coordination and its attendant
problems, while recognising that this problem can be real enough, does
not regard it as a necessary condition of a coordination problem. The
most difficult problems are different. They have to do with finding a way
of satisfying the four subjective conditions, which are necessary to secure
coordination. I hope that it is now plain how authorities can play a cru-
cial role in securing coordination, and how this role is crucial in estab-
lishing the legitimacy of political authorities.
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Knowing the limits of my knowledge and understanding, and being
aware of the danger that my judgment will be affected by bias, and my
performance by the weakness of my resolve, I am aware of the possibility
that another person, or organization, might be better able to judge when
there are sufficient reasons for social coordination to which I should con-
tribute. This may be the case if the person or organization is less likely to
be biased than I am and if they have greater expertise than I concerning
the goods and social needs for which coordination may be needed, and
the ways of achieving them.78 In such a case I should adopt a rule to
follow the instructions of such a person or body, to regard them as
authorities, within certain specified bounds. The rule will be justified by
the fact that following it will lead me to participate in justified coordi-
nated social behaviour more reliably than if I should try to decide for
myself when the conditions of a coordination problem exist, and when I
should follow a certain course of conduct as a way of participating in a
justified coordinative practice.79
So far I have been assuming that all the conditions for a coordinat-
ing practice, barring (when it is a condition for the existence of the prac-
tice) my participation, exist. The authority I recognise is an authority on
(some) existing coordinative practices. It can instruct me better than I
can myself when such practices are justified and how I should contribute
to them.8" But often I should take a further step. I should recognise that
other people are in my position and that if we all adopt a coordinative
practice to follow the directives of a certain body within certain limits
then we will all be able to establish and preserve justified coordinative
practices which would otherwise evade our grasp. The reason is that by
sharing the knowledge that we all assigned to this body the power to
decide for us when coordination problems (in the objective sense) exist,
and to make generally known its proposed solutions, we make sure that
the subjective conditions are met. We know that they are met whenever
the body whose authority we recognise issues one of its directives. 8'
78. It is sufficient if that person or body is advised by people with such expertise, and tends to
follow such advice.
79. The full story requires much refinement. I may regard the authority's directives as suffi-
cient to indicate that the reasons for coordination, within the specified limits, require certain conduct
of me, without regarding its directive as a necessary condition for such a conclusion. This seems to
be the common attitude, though there are cases in which the authority's directives are regarded,
perhaps justifiably, as necessary conditions.
80. There is a further advantage to having such an authority. By making the matter public,
and involving other people in it, it can strengthen me against weakness of the will.
81. This is again too simple. I am assuming that the authority is limited to solving coordina-
tion problems only. In the normal case in which it has other powers as well, all we know is that if its
directive is meant to solve a coordination problem, then (1) there is likely to be such a problem, (2)
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In other words, there can be justified (second-order) coordinative
practices setting a person or body as a coordinative authority, that is, as
capable of authoritatively determining when there is a coordination prob-
lem and what to do about it, and such practices may be justified. Such
practices are neither rules of thumb, which can achieve their aims
regardless of their adoption by others, nor indicator rules. But they are
rules which justify the legitimacy of an authority (within proper bounds)
in accordance with the normal justification thesis. They enable all of us
to solve coordination problems better than we might when we try to
judge for ourselves whether there is a coordination problem and whether
the subjective conditions for its solution are met.
Now we see how the two objections mentioned earlier are met. The
argument shows that the coordinative role of the authority functions as a
preemptive reason (thus solving Green's objection), because the whole
purpose of following the authorities, directives will be defeated if I try to
follow my own judgment in the matters entrusted to the authority judg-
ment. The whole point of recognising the authority was that its judg-
ment should be trusted rather than mine. All the standard arguments I
advanced for regarding authoritative directives as preemptive reasons
apply here.82
Furthermore, the authoritative directives are reasons for action not
only when a new coordinative practice is to be set, but also when it is
already in existence, or at least might be in existence. First,83 the popula-
tion subject to the directive is constantly changing, people die and others
come of age, some emigrate and some immigrate. With practices partici-
pation in which depends on other conditions there are other reasons for
the fluctuations. People become parents of minors, and stop being so,
they become income earners, and they stop being so. Such fluctuations
may well threaten the stability of coordinative practices, for they put in
question the satisfaction of the subjective conditions. If the second-order
practice of recognising the authority of the government remains intact, it
prevents such destabilization. It is easier to secure the satisfaction of the
subjective conditions regarding the one practice of authority, as all coun-
tries do by directing much publicity and educational efforts to this end,
the directive is likely to point to a best solution to the problem, and (3) the subjective conditions are
met. We also know that if the directive is not based on the need to solve a coordination problem (but
falls within the jurisdiction of the authority) then it is likely to be justified on other grounds.
82. Cf. J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 38-69; J. RAZ, THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 3-27.
83. The following argument is based on a suggestion of Richard Warner.
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than to secure their satisfaction regarding many diverse individual coor-
dinative practices. Hence, authorities are useful as a means of securing
the continuity of coordinative practices in the face of changing popula-
tions. Second, by relying on the authoritative directives I am spared the
need to judge for myself if the coordinative practice exists (a task at
which I am no expert). Furthermore, knowing that others are likely to
reason like me makes it more likely that the practice exists. And this is
doubly so since it is common knowledge that I and others reason in this
way.
Two crucial points must be mentioned here. This argument is
meant to reinforce my observation in The Morality of Freedom that only
a de facto authority can be a legitimate coordinative authority. Natu-
rally, the loss of the obedience of the population undermines the whole
argument and denies the authority its legitimacy. Second, it may well be
that in cases where it is clear that the hoped for coordinative practice
failed to materialize after a time the directive intended to secure and
maintain the practice should not be regarded as binding. It is arguable
that though authorities should repeal such directives, they cannot be
trusted to do so. Therefore, if it is clear to all that the hoped for practice
failed to come into existence, the continued existence of the directive can-
not reliably be used in the argument made in the preceding paragraph.
D. THE PREEMPTIVE FORCE OF AUTHORITATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
My preemption thesis states that directives which fall within the
bounds of an authority's jurisdiction should replace rather than be added
to the balance of reasons on which the authority had power to pro-
nounce. The previous discussion indirectly illustrates and adds support
to the thesis. I argued for it explicitly in Chapter 3 of The Morality of
Freedom. In the appendix to his article, Regan presents an interesting
argument which, if successful, undermines the thesis. It is addressed at
one simple argument I made. I suggested that if one knows that another
person performs better than oneself (in the sense of making the correct
decision more often), and if one has not further information which would
suggest in which subclass of cases the other person's judgment is better
than one's own, then one will do better by following the other person's
advice than by any strategy which will assign some weight to both one's
own independent judgment and to that person's advice.
My suggestion was that this informal argument can be formalized
and can be generalised so that it will apply to all cases which display
these features, however unlike they are in other respects to the example I
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used to illustrate my point. In reply, Regan attempts a more rigorous
statement of the assumptions and the steps in the argument and finds
that his attempt at generalising the argument failed. His version of the
argument holds only under certain conditions. This seems to me plausi-
ble,84 but I see no reason to believe that my informal argument cannot be
generalised.
The one substantive difference of opinion between us revealed by
this discussion lies in Regan's suggestion that it would be reasonable for
people in the situation envisaged in my example, who lack any further
information, to adopt a policy of following their own judgment when
they feel that the case is clear and following the authority when they are
less clear, or when they feel that the case is close. Regan thinks it is a
priori true that, for the most part, people make more mistakes in the
latter type of case than in the former. I doubt this assumption in this
general form. I tend to think that it holds good only where people have a
good enough grasp of what determines the correctness of decisions, or
where they are lucky enough to have discovered a good correlate of cor-
rect decisions even though they have but a poor understanding of what
accounts for the correctness of their decisoins. In other cases, especially
in cases in which they hold mistaken beliefs about the matter they decide
on (as when they have a wrong belief about the relations between infla-
tion and the value of shares, or where they hold some astrological theory
about the success of wars), there is no reason to believe that there is a
positive correlation between seeing the matter as clear and a likelihood of
being right.8
When one does have an account of what makes a decision right then
one may well have the additional information required to indicate in
what subclass of cases the other person is worse than oneself. In such
cases one should not follow the person's advice regarding that subclass of
cases at all. As Regan realises, this conforms to the aim of my argament
which was meant to show that considerations of reliability may lead to
letting others' views preempt one's judgment or to their dismissal as
irrelevant.86
84. As Regan does not provide a complete account of his argument one has to reserve final
judgment.
85. It is possible that something like Regan's thesis is true in a special range of cases, or in
much qualified form. Evolutionary theory may lead one in some such direction. Whether there is
any a priori thesis to that effect is moot.
86. Others' views, however, may serve as warnings that one may wrong. As such they may
make one double check or hedge one's bets.
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I think that Regan has not produced a counter-example to my argu-
ment. But I am not confident that no counter-example can be found.
Regan's own attempt at a counter-example amounts to treating an
expert's advice as a weighting consideration, to use Perry's terminol-
ogy.8 7 The argument can be made that at least under some conditions
when one has reason to give extra weight to another's judgment that
person has authority over one. It is not easy to make this idea more
precise. It calls for an evaluation in two rounds. First, the subject forms
a judgment on the issue at hand, taking into account the advice received
by others but excluding (all or some of the) considerations which bear on
the reliability of that judgment. In the second round, one brings in those
considerations (for example, I am somewhat intoxicated, or I am rather
ignorant about such issues). In light of these considerations one may
come to the view that the judgment of the other person should be given a
greater weight than one was originally inclined to give it. When these
and other as yet unspecified conditions are met then the other person has
authority over one. Neither Perry nor Regan is strictly committed to
such a view, though some of their points suggest it. The matter seems to
me fraught with difficulties and requires much more careful considera-
tion than I can give it here.
E. RESPECT FOR LAW
Both Regan and Green object to my claim that an attitude of respect
for law, which expresses itself in a belief that one has a duty to obey the
law because it is our law, the law of our country, expresses identification
with one's society and is, when such identification is valuable, self-vindi-
cating, that is, that the people who have such an attitude have the duty
they believe in. Regan believes that respect for law provides reason for
obeying the law. But he denies that it amounts to an obligation to obey.
He professes some bewilderment about the difference between having an
obligation and having a reason. 88 I am sorry that he does not advert to
my attempt to elucidate duties in terms of categorical protected reasons,
that is, ones which do not depend on the desires of their subject (though
they may be sensitive to them) and which have preemptive force.89 How
does that apply to respect and the obligation of obedience? To recap
briefly, my argument is as follows: Respect for law can be a reason for
obeying the law because it can manifest an attitude of identification with
87. See Perry, supra note 2, at 913.
88. See Regan, supra note 63, at 1035-36.
89. See Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, SOCIETY AND MORALITY, ESSAYS IN HON-
OUR OF H.L.A. HART 210 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds. 1977).
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one's society, or such an attitude may be valuable. I shall say nothing
about why and when it is valuable to identify with one's society, and to
express this through one's attitude to its law. But how can respect for
the law express such identification? It does so in expressing trust in the
government of the society which passed the law and is in charge of its
enforcement. The trust shows one's confidence that one's society and its
institutions work together, and that by and large they do so in the right
way. The trust is expressed in holding oneself bound to obey the law
because it is made by the government, without submitting every law and
regulation to careful scrutiny to see whether they are the best, or whether
they are just, or whether one has reasons to obey or to disobey them.
Instead of such case by case scrutiny one accepts the law on trust as
binding. This is a very crude outline of one crucial step in the argument.
But it makes clear that if at all valid, it establishes a preemptive reason to
obey, and therefore that it qualifies as a duty. Regan in expressing his
doubts about respect (and consent) amounting to a duty to obey does not
address this argument.
This is not an oversight on his part. He finds the argument unper-
suasive. It has, he says, the form of inferring from "It would be a good
thing if X" that "X", where "X" is a moral proposition.9" Regan is
surprised that anyone should find this a valid form of argument. Perhaps
in the very general form it is not valid. But a suitably restricted form of
it is a standard presumptive justification of normative conclusions on
instrumental grounds. One may argue, for example: if such and such a
duty exists (e.g., a duty to give to charity), then people will give to char-
ity. Since it is good that people should give to charity it is right to con-
clude, other things being equal, that they owe such a duty. The only
unusual feature of my argument is that it was not instrumental, but tries
to justify an intrinsic good. Therefore, it involves self-reference (an atti-
tude being justified by the goodness of itself). Regan does not find these
novel features problematical. I assume that he objects to the justification
of any duties on instrumentalist grounds. But I am not clear what his
objection is.91
90. Regan, supra note 63, at 1037.
91. My guess is that this point is related to what is to me the most obscure aspect of Regan's
comments. He seems to raise true moral reasons (unlike mere rules or thumb and other instrumen-
tal or contingent considerations) to an elevated level. That is why he suspects that I wish to regard
authority and legitimacy as thicker than my arguments justify, and why he insists that authorities
are based merely on indicator rules which establish neither legitimacy nor duties, and which cannot
be obeyed. I find all this mystifying. To my mind the sort of considerations that Regan and I have
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Green does not share Regan's misgivings about my handling of con-
sent (Regan regards consent and respect as in the same boat, as in most
respects I do too). But he objects to the argument for a semi-voluntary
obligation to obey the law deriving from respect for the law. It is not
clear to me which part of my argument he rejects. He does not seem to
reject the factual aspect of the argument, that some people have the
beliefs and the attitudes I described. His objection is to the claim that
their beliefs are self-vindicating. He makes one point: To express identi-
fication, an action must be appropriate to this role. Obedience is not
appropriate.9 2 I have to admit that I am baffled by this claim. It is not
backed by any argument.9 3 All I can do is repeat briefly my position:
The normal justification thesis shows that an obligation to obey exists
when the government can be trusted to guide one correctly, that is, when
following its guidance conforms to independent reasons. Belief in an
obligation to obey is, therefore, an expression of trust in the govern-
ment.94 Trust is a fitting expression of loyalty and identification. It is a
conventional expression of loyalty to one's spouse or friends. And it ful-
fills a similar role in our attitudes to institutions such as universities or
trade unions or other associations of which one may be a member. In the
life of some people, that is those who regard their government and their
law as an aspect of their society and its life, trust in the government
expresses an identification with the society and is expressed in a belief in
an obligation to obey.
As I have already mentioned, such identification is valuable only
under certain conditions, among them that people's trust in the law is not
completely misplaced. It is misplaced, for example, in an unjust legal
system. Such a system does not deserve to be trusted, and no valid obli-
gation can be derived from someone's belief that it does. This means that
respect for law is not the normal justification for the authority of the law.
It is dependent on and derived from the normal justification being met to
a high degree. But when this is the case it is an important secondary
justification, and it helps establish the authority of the law beyond the
been examining are precisely the considerations which validate claims of legitimacy, duty, and obedi-
ence, and if this makes such terms thinner than someone thinks they are (whatever that may mean),
so be it.
92. See Green, supra note 53, at 812-18.
93. Green has a brief and inconclusive discussion of the appropriateness of obedience as an
expression of gratittde, but none of the suitability of a duty of obedience as an expression of
identification.
94. The "therefore" is a bit too quick. It assumes that the basic stand of the normal justifica-




limits set by the normal justification thesis alone. The value of identifica-
tion may compensate for a lack in some other aspect in the law which
would otherwise mean that its authority is not complete."
F. QUESTIONS ABOUT CITIZENSHIP AND AUTHORITY
Green disagrees with the modest role I assigned to consent as a
source of governmental authority. As we saw above, he has a good case.
But he has a different explanation of the role of consent. He regards
governmental authority as resting on consent to the role of citizenship,
which includes acceptance of the authority of the government and of an
obligation to obey the law.96 This view seems to me to lack, as yet, suffi-
cient articulation to evaluate its merits. Green indicates, for example,
that he understands consent to apply in "a somewhat extended" sense,97
but he gives no analysis of what counts as consent. We are not told, for
instance, whether such undertakings bind for life, or whether they are
revocable. My conviction that whatever factors justify regarding consent
to the authority of the law as binding exist in other cases which fall short
of consent as well led me to develop the idea of respect for law as an
additional source of obligation. Green does not react to that aspect of
the argument. Nor does Green tell us much about the role of citizenship,
or its value to the individuals who assume it. The little he says is insuffi-
cient to allow one to judge whether that value does not reside precisely in
enabling citizens to identify with their society, which is the value I
claimed as validating, under appropriate conditions, both respect and
consent. Green says that "lflt is not so much that consenting to obey
expresses a valuable feeling of belonging to one's society, but that it con-
cretely instantiates a form of association which may be regarded as a
shared good." 98 However, when he describes the value of that form of
association, he explains it in terms of civic ties and social solidarity of all
95. Notice that in my view identification is a possible, but not a compulsory (secondary),
source of the authority of law. Moreover, people may express such identification by accepting a
qualified obligation to obey. They may, for example, extend it to all but the duty to serve in the
armed forces. See J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 259. I should add that the
secondary nature of the justification is appreciated by Green, who seems for some reason to regard it
as an objection to my view. See L. GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 182-84 (1988); Green,
supra note 53. This is all the more surprising since in Green's own view consent, which is the only
way to establish an obligation to obey, is itself dependent for its validity on the normal justification
thesis and satisfaction of the condition of autonomy. This makes it dependent to a greater extent
than it is in my view, since I allow for trade-offs between the degree to which the normal justification
thesis is satisfied and the value of identification.
96. See L. GREEN, supra note 95, at cl. 7; Green, supra note 53, at 818 passim.
97. L. GREEN, supra note 95, at 205.
98. Id. at 208.
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those who share the role of citizens.99 This may or may not mean more
than a sense of belonging to, of identifying with, the citizenry, and what
is implied by such attitudes. We are not told enough to know.
I am not suggesting, of course, that there are no visible differences
between Green's view and mine. Here are two ways in which my notion
is wider than his. First, the commonality Green is talking about is the
commonality of the citizens. I was talking of a vaguer notion of belong-
ing to a society. Clearly, people who did not consent to the authority of
the law, nor share respect for it, can still be members of the society with
which I identify. I identify with my society by respecting the law which
governs and rules it. I thus identify with a society in which many views
obtain, including those of people who are suspicious of the law. My
justification does not require reciprocity. Green's does. By becoming a
citizen I share civic ties only with people who are, in this respect, like-
minded." ° For Green, accepting the authority of the law which governs
the whole society is part of the role of the citizen shared by only some of
its members. This seems to me to tell quite decisively against Green's
view. Second, Green's consent can have effect only in societies which
conventionally have a role of citizen.' 0 Mine contains no such limita-
tion. It requires a society in which respect for law is a recognised way of
expressing trust and loyalty, but it does not require the socially defined
complex of rights and duties defining citizenship that marks Green's
view.
Finally, let me mention one consideration which, pending a further
elaboration of Green's view, seems to me to militate against it. I do not
believe that our notion of citizenship is tied to the law in the way sup-
posed by Green. I doubt whether there is a social role of citizenship
which in our society makes a difference to the obligation under private
law to perform one's contractual undertakings or to a surgeon's duty to
exercise due care in surgical operations, etc. Citizenship seems to be a
political and public notion. It may well affect people's attitude toward
political and public law, that is, to those which define the system of gov-
ernment and the public character of life in the society concerned. It is
doubtful whether it has much to do with relations between individuals in
what is, generally speaking, the private domain.
99. Id.
100. It excludes not only "foreigners," but also those who are legally citizens but since they
never consented to this status, are not citizens in Green's sense. See Green, supra note 53, at 817-18




III. LAW AND LEGAL PRECEDENTS
A. THE FUNCTIONS OF LAW
In his article, Burton considers some of the fundamental questions
of legal philosophy, such as the relations between law, reason, and moral-
ity. He raises issues which require much further thought. The limita-
tions of the occasion prevent me from engaging in that debate here.
However, I will briefly address a few of Burtion's views.
Burton favours a generalised definition of law which is sufficiently
imprecise to be consistent with all main line approaches to law. Such a
definition may indeed have some use in popularising philosophical ideas.
Its use is, however, more limited than meets the eye. It is only to be
expected that divergent legal theories will converge when they come to
identify the phenomena discussed. This does not guarantee convergence
of the underlying structure of the theories or of their motivations and
insights, nor does Burton suppose otherwise. But the divergence of
underlying justifications may make it difficult to defend the generalised,
imprecise definition without taking sides in the philosophical controver-
sies that Burton wishes to avoid.
More interesting is another limitation of his approach. It is tempt-
ing to think, as Burton does, that a generalised and imprecise definition
of law, like his, is less likely to be wrong than any of the more sharply
defined theories in legal philosophy. But this is a mistake. There is no
reason to think e.g. that the next theory to appear will fall within the
sphere demarcated by the generalised definition. Since new theories
almost invariably involve conceptual revision, they may well cut across
the conceptual distinctions relied upon in the definition. The survival of
the definition as a representation of the broad consensus depends on
one's luck and intuition in deciding which way to generalise from
existing theories. It is arguable, for example, that Perry's conception of
the law is inconsistent with Burton's generalised definition.t0 2 Perry con-
siders my general analysis of the function of law,10 3 according to which
102. See Perry, supra note 2, at 958-59.
103. Perry regards my general discussion of the nature of law as a Dworkinian interpretation.
Id. at 948-49. This it is not. This is not the place to analyze the differences, but I'll mention two: In
Dworkin's terms you may say that my aim is to analyse the concept of law, whereas Dworkin
concentrates on proposing a particular conception of law. More accurately, I am not committed to
the concept/conception distinction which is crucial to Dworkinian interpretation. Second, Dworkin
thinks that any interpretation is successful in proportion to its ability to present whatever it inter-
prets as being as good as is possible. I do not think that this is an aim or a criterion of the success of
interpretation in general, nor do I try to present an explanation of the law which makes it as good of
its kind, whatever that may mean, as possible.
1989] 1201
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.62:1153
institutionalised guidance of conduct is the most abstract statement of
the function of law, and contrasts it with his own: "[T]he basic function
of law is not the guidance of the citizens' conduct as such but rather the
institutionalized adjudication and social resolution of disputes in accord-
ance with appropriate principles of personal and political morality."10
4
Perry fully anticipates my, and other people's, response to his claim.
The two functions under discussion are not in the least incompatible.
Indeed, I, for example, have long maintained that all legal systems pro-
vided for the resolution or processing of unregulated disputes, that is,
disputes regarding which pre-existing laws do not uniquely determine
one correct answer, but whose resolution requires the use of judicial dis-
cretion.105 It is true that I do not believe that all legal systems provide
for the resolution of all disputes. If that is part of Perry's claim, then I
believe him to be factually mistaken. But he would probably disavow
any such interpretation of his thesis. Where then is the difference?
One problem is that Perry's statement of the law's function cannot
be the whole story. It leaves out the importance of legislation in the law.
Perry replies that morality dictates that disputes should be resolved on
the basis of statutes, where such statutes are available. In this way legis-
lation is covered by his general statement of the function of the law,
which refers to morality. This, however, is an inadequate response.
Racialist legislation is part of South African law even though morality
does not require the judiciary in South Africa to enforce it. This state-
ment is controversial, but the abstract point need not be. There are
"evil" statutes in various legal systems which morality does not require
the judges to enforce, but which are part of the law. That judicial disobe-
dience of the law is morally justified is a logical possibility which Perry's
conception of the law does not admit. Guidance through law-making is
an essential feature of all law not because morality requires it, but simply
because the law is this kind of a social institution.
A second problem is that Perry's own assumptions make clear that
he is not presenting a general account of the function of law since he
concedes that his account does not apply to the criminal law. 10 6 Perry
may argue that my statement of the law's general function is similarly
104. Id. at 958.
105. The inevitability of the task follows fi-om the impossibility in principle of drawing a sharp
divide between regulated and unregulated disputes.
106. Since the criminal law in England is largely a common-law-based branch of the law, at
least in its origins and general principles, this fact is crucial to evaluating some of Perry's further
claims. He may, for example, be forced to entertain the possibility that English law has two doe-
trines of precedent, one for private law and one for public law (including the criminal law).
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incomplete in not mentioning the resolution of conflicts. Judicial pro-
ceedings do, however, lead to determination of how the parties ought to
conduct themselves. This is why I assumed that resolution of disputes is
but one aspect of the institutionalised guidance of behaviour by law. The
centrality of this aspect of the law has always been a key feature of my
writing. If it clarifies matters, I have of course no objection to singling
out Perry's function for special mention, once it is amended to recognise
the special importance of law-making as a source of standards for dispute
resolution.
B. COMMON LAW ADJUDICATION: SOME PRELIMINARIES
The truth is that the preceding discussion misses what is interesting
about Perry's views. His statement of the function of law is far too gen-
eral, as well as incomplete, to carry the burden of his distinctive views.
In the sequel I will examine the substance of his objections to my posi-
tion, independently of his general characterisation of himself, based on
his endorsement of the description of the function of law that we have
examined, as adjudicativist. He is making two separate claims: (1) My
account of common law adjudication is inadequate; and (implicitly) (2)
my account of the limits of law, of the boundary between law and non-
legal standards, is inadequate. No explicit argument for (2) is offered. It
is implicitly supported by his argument for (1). Undermining my
account of common law adjudication is meant to undermine my claims
about the limit of law. I will concentrate only on the issue of common
law adjudication. Moore also challenges my understanding of adjudica-
tion, both regarding precedent and concerning statutory interpretation.
It may be useful to start with a response to Moore's objections, since my
response to them consists mainly in clarifying obscurities in my previous
writings.
I am unable to reply directly to Moore's objection in his Part V.° 7
My vision is obscured by the fact that Moore seems to have misunder-
stood my views on a number of counts and at other points simply states
as given propositions to which I see no reason to agree. Let me try to
clarify some of these points.
(1) I do not have "a theory of precedent," nor do I believe that such
a theory exists, if by that one means a theory about how judges ought to
decide cases or treat precedent. These are largely matters of law differ-
ently regulated by the law of different countries. I do not mean that they
107. See Moore, supra note 4, at 883-85.
1989] FACING UP 1203
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1153
are subject to explicit legislation or precedent. Even where they are,
these give but an imperfect picture of the law, which is in the main con-
stituted by the practices of the courts and of the legal profession. There
are, it is true, a few general jurisprudential statements one can make on
these issues, but they do not amount to a theory. In Chapter Ten of The
Authority of Law, I outlined some features of the English practice in
order to illustrate how some of the general jurisprudential points fit in
with the practice of one country.0°8 Naturally, different accounts are
needed to show how the same jurisprudential points fit with the practices
of different countries.
(2) I do believe that courts have discretion in every case, in so-
called.easy cases no less than in so-called hard ones. In every case, e.g.,
the court has discretion to distinguish a binding precedent, and in many
it has the discretion to overrule it.
(3) I am not sure what Moore has in mind when he refers to the
"three levels of influence" that a precedent may have.109 I do not think
that is a view which I hold. Perhaps I believe in two levels of influence.
A binding precedent is binding, and has (in England) to be followed
unless it is distinguished or overruled. Besides, it, like any other part of
the law, affects moral considerations in the way that any fact does. Like
the existence of a wall, it may indicate the moral desirability of an indi-
rect approach, or the unattainability of certain goals. In my view, this is
the best way to understand analogical arguments. They show how a new
decision fits with the existing facts. They are not reasons for or against it,
but they provide information which is relevant to such reasons.
(4) Moore says that I "cannot mean that judges should.., regard
the ratio [as a protected reason] when they are distinguishing or
extending it... for to carry out their obligations here judges must not
exclude any moral considerations." 0 I am afraid that I disagree. There
is at least one legal system, namely, the English one (the only one I was
discussing in the text considered by Moore), where they must so regard
the ratio. Naturally, the fact that the ratio is a protected reason does not
impede the courts when they decide to lay down a similar rule for cases
to which the ratio does not apply (that is, when they extend it); in such
cases they do not interfere with the existing law where it does apply.
Since it remains the same, its protected status is not called into question
108. See J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 180-209.
109. Moore, supra note 4, at 886.
110. Id. at 887.
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and does not come into play.11 When rules are distinguished they are
modified and they can be modified only on the basis of non-excluded
reasons. The fact that the whole rule which is being distinguished is
unjust, for example, is excluded, and is not a ground for distinguishing it.
In short, it is the fact that the rule is a protected reason which forces the
courts to distinguish rather than overrule. 2 In defending his claim,
Moore simply resorts to his allegation considered above113 that a limited
power to distinguish is undesirable. 4 This, even if true, does not refute
the existence of such a limitation in English law. Furthermore, as shown
in the previous discussion, Moore is mistaken in the reasons he advances
for the undesirability of all restriction of judicial powers.11
(5) Moore has caught me in another careless statement. I said that
the reason the actual formulation of the ratio does not carry the weight of
statutory language is that courts are often a little careless in their formu-
lations.1 16 This makes it sound as if the difference between the legal
effect of statutes and precedent noted there is a matter of universal moral
necessity. All I meant is that that distinction exists in English law, and
that it is sensible because of that reason. Of course, had a different prac-
tice prevailed, judges would have become much more like legislative
draftsmen in their habits.
(6) I did not, however, say that the ratio is the justification for the
stated holding. The ratio is what is stated, but when we understand what
is stated we are not entitled to attribute the same importance to the
choice of words, and to the text in isolation, as we do with statutes. The
interpretation of what is stated is much more context-dependent. Both in
statutory interpretation and in the interpretation of precedents the first
question (though not the last, since there is much more to interpretation
than explaining the law as it is) is what was said. Both are concerned
with understanding acts of communication, but these acts take place
within two different practices of communication, leading to different
styles of expression and different conventions of interpretation.
11I. This seems to be recognised by Moore in the paragraph starting "This thought by Raz is
not inconsistent with.... "id., which seems to me to contradict the claim I cited from his preceding
paragraph.
112. The reason for the emergence of the doctrine which states when cases can be distinguished
is the fact that many courts may not overrule. This led by extension to the practice of separating
overruling from distinguishing even in the practice of courts which can do both.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
114. Moore, supra note 4, at 888.
115. I should, perhaps, repeat my suspicion that Moore's mistake is not in ignoring relevant
moral considerations, but in mischaracterising their logical features.
116. Moore, supra note 4, at 888-99.
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I hope that these clarifications remove both the charge of inconsis-
tency and the problem of the level of abstraction at which to understand
the ratio. Both objections depend on the same misunderstanding of my
observation that the language of cases is not canonical in the way the
language of statutes is.
(7) There remains one last objection (not counting as an objection
Moore's observation that a case which may be within the core of one rule
may be within the penumbra of another, nor his remark that one needs a
linguistic theory which accounts for the difference between core and
penumbra). Moore says that according to what I called the pre-emption
thesis one should not count the reasons for the rule when applying a rule,
but the reasons for the rule count when interpreting its application to
cases on which its impact is vague. I do not see any problem here. All I
have argued for are two points. First, the identification of a legal rule
should be independent of the reasons for the rule. Second, in applying a
rule in cases of conflict, its weight and that of the reasons it is based upon
should not both count. Neither of these is affected by considering the
reasons for a particular rule in deciding whether it should apply to cases
to which it does not clearly apply. Such applications are law-creative
rather than law-applying, whereas my observations elucidate the nature
of the application of rules.
The last point is relevant to an assessment of Perry's criticism as
well. He mentions as an advantage of his view that "the courts con-
stantly stay in touch, so to speak, with the ultimate first-order reasoning
which is the subject of the presumptive weighting process."'1 17 This is
true and is an inescapable consequence of my analysis as well. Since
courts have discretion, at least (in England) discretion to distinguish, in
every case, they have to consider the reasoning underlying the legal rule
which applies in the case (at least where the use of that discretion is
seriously in question). As I explained above, this is consistent both with
the sources thesis and with the exclusionary character of judge-made law.
Before we proceed with Perry's main arguments, different strands in
his criticism should be separated. Though he treats all the issues as if
they were one, Perry criticises my views on three distinct, and logically
independent issues. First, he argues that the binding precedents set by
common law courts should not be interpreted as protected reasons. Sec-
ond, he claims that the rulings of such courts cannot be identified inde-
pendently of the reasons which led to their adoption. Third, he holds
117. Perry, supra note 2, at 972.
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some version of what I call the "no difference" thesis, according to which
judicial decisions are taken on the basis of what he calls "morally rele-
vant" reasons, and not on the basis of forward-looking rules laid down in
binding precedents."' It is only on the second issue, my tentative
espousal of the sources thesis, that his criticism addresses itself to my
theory of law. The other two points of contention concern my attempt to
explain the practice of precedent in the English common law only.1 19
C. ON SOURCES AND EXCLUSIONS
Let me start with Perry's radical challenge to my theory-his chal-
lenge to the sources thesis. He advances only one argument, which I will
quote:
The non-exclusionary conception of precedent attributes a certain pre-
sumptive weight to the reasoning of previous decisions, but it does not
presuppose that the identification of that reasoning will itself be value
free. Often it will be necessary to reconstruct the arguments of a previ-
ous decision, relying unavoidably on one's own moral sensibilities in
the process, in order just to arrive at a clear understanding of them. 120
As it stands the argument fails. To identify the court's reasoning I
need to reason in a way I know or believe that the court was likely to
have reasoned. If the court was of my moral sensibilities, then I may
indeed rely on my moral sensibilities in doing so. But this would not be
because my moral views are (believed by me to be) correct, but because
they are shared by the court. That this does not violate the sources thesis
is clear from the fact that if I know that the court's moral sensibilities
differ from mine, I will not rely on my sensibilities in reconstructing its
reasoning. Rather, I will rely on whatever I know about the court's
118. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 2, at 981. While Perry identifies my position as positivist on
account of my views on all three issues, he knows that I myself regard legal positivism as committed
only to something like the sources thesis, that is, to a view like the one I discussed on the second of
the three issues.
119. Perry claims that his explanation of the Common Law vindicates Dworkin's theory of law.
But there is only a tenuous connection between his views and Dworkin's. Perry agrees with Dwor-
kin, and with many others, that what is law and what is not is, in part, a moral question. I will argue
that this point is not supported by the rest of Perry's views. More pertinently, Perry's view of civil
law adjudication is identical with one interpretation of Dworkin's Rights Thesis, that is, with its
interpretation as the view that in deciding a case the courts should have regard to the relative merits
of the case of the litigants only. It is quite likely, though I will not argue the point here, that this is
not the way Dworkin himself understands his thesis. See, Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra
note 32, at 123. Many of Dworkin's more distinctive views are neither supported nor contradicted
by Perry's account. Being an account of private law adjudication in the common law it is, not
surprisingly, consistent with a variety of legal theories, including, as I will argue, mine.
120. Perry, supra note 2, at 973.
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views to reconstruct its arguments on the occasion which is of concern to
me. Since the structure of my reasoning in the two cases is the same, and
since I do not use moral reasoning in a sense inconsistent with the
sources thesis when I reconstruct the reasoning of a non-like-minded
court, it follows that I do not violate the sources thesis in reconstructing
the reasoning of a like-minded court.
121
Are common law decisions protected reasons? Above I explained
that there is no logical necessity for the decisions of the highest court of
appeals of a country to hold that it must view its own decisions as pro-
tected reasons. My general way of understanding the law entails that
those who do not have power to change the law are legally required to
view it as a protected reason. This entails that if legal decisions create
law, then courts of first instance can only have a limited power to change
the law, that is that they are legally required to regard it as a protected
reason. But, I suggested above, the same need not apply to the highest
court(s). It may be able to change the law whenever it sees fit in light of
the balance of all reasons.
As I understand him, Perry does not deny that common law prece-
dents are in general protected reasons. He does not deny that my analy-
sis applies to the criminal law, or, presumably, to other areas of public
law. His concern is exclusively with private law adjudication. Nor does
he deny that prior to the 1966 Practice Statement the English House of
Lords regarded its own decisions as protected reasons binding not only
lower courts but itself as well. This means that he does not deny that
lower courts, in England, are legally required to regard binding decisions
of higher courts as protected reasons, and that even today the Court of
Appeal is similarly required to regard its own decisions as protected
reasons. 122
This leaves two possible areas of disagreement. First, what is the
degree of deference to its prior decisions which the House of Lords is
bound to display today? Here Perry convincingly argues that the court's
duty is not to overrule itself unless the earlier decision is clearly mistaken
and its reversal would constitute a significant improvement. I agree that
this accounts better for the practice of the court than my suggestion that
the court regards only certain grounds as suitable for overruling.'23 I
121. For an assertion of the same point, see J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at
40.
122. For agreement on all these points, see Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Com-
mon Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 244 (1987).
123. J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 114.
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was nearer the truth when I said "that a court should not overrule unless
it is certain that the new rule is an improvement compared with the old
one." I went on to emphasise "the disadvantages under which the courts
labour in trying to assess the different social and economic consequences
of different legal arrangement. Hence the need to avoid acting unless one
is certain that the change is an improvement, however small it may
be." 124 This is somewhat closer to Perry's view. As Perry is aware, this
explanation is compatible with regarding the court subject to an exclu-
sionary reason. 125 The second area of disagreement concerns the analysis
of the power of the English courts to distinguish earlier cases. On this
point, I am not sure of the superiority of Perry's analysis to mine.
126 I
will not, however, consider the issue here beyond noticing that our disa-
greement is limited. Perry thinks that binding precedents are in part epi-
stemically-bounded exclusionary reasons. He also thinks that they are
often weighted reasons. They may be. If he is right, his views on this
matter form a further development and refinement of the general position
which I have outlined.
D. FORWARD-LOOKING PRECEDENTS
The most distinctive of Perry's claims is that in all private law cases
the courts decide only on the basis of considerations of justice between
the litigants before them. This I take to be the point of his statement that
"the system continues to settle disputes on the basis of exactly the same
sorts of moral considerations as before.... "127 Courts should disregard
any considerations of social justice, the general welfare, or any others
which manifest concern for people other than the litigants. They should,
therefore, not take account of the fact that their decision is a binding
precedent and will, both in my view and in Perry's, constrain the way
courts will decide in the future. Perry thinks that I am committed to
denying this proposition because I say that in unregulated disputes courts
"act and should act just as legislators do, namely, they should adopt
those rules which they judge best."1 28 But this is a mistake. The quota-
tion commits me to advocating decisions based on forward-looking,
socially-oriented considerations only if they are the best. Perry thinks
124. J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 190-91; see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 32-34.
125. See Perry, supra note 2, at 934-35; J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at
62.
126. See Perry, supra note 122, for Perry's analysis.
127. Perry, supra note 2, at 972.
128. Id. at 984 (citing J. RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 32, at 197).
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that such decisions are unjust. If he is right, then they are not the best
and should not be adopted by the courts. According to Perry, the injus-
tice of the forward-looking considerations has much to do with the fact
that, in a view like mine, they amount to retrospective legislation. But as
my advice to Parliament to enact the best rules does not commit me to
recommend retroactive Parliamentary legislation, so the same advice to
the courts does not commit me to recommend unjust judicial decisions.
The first question in trying to understand how common law adjudi-
cation works in practice is, how do courts decide cases? Do they take
account of forward-looking considerations? Perry is clear in his own
mind that they should not. But can he also argue with the same confi-
dence that they do not? There seems to be too much evidence to the
contrary.
It is, of course, possible that the practice of the common law courts
is unfair and unjust. Perry appears to belong with the many theorists
who find it difficult, and in the case of some, impossible, to entertain the
idea that the practices of the common law courts might be unjust. It is
an advantage of views like mine that they leave the question open. But I
think Perry exaggerates the injustice that may be involved. To see this,
imagine that the court's decision is no precedent at all. Should it take
into account general considerations of social welfare and distributive jus-
tice in deciding between the parties? Take Perry's example and assume
with him that "the Hand test would, if complied with by the bulk of the
population, lead to the socially optimal level of accident occurrence."
12 9
Assume that this means it is justified for the legislature to adopt it.
Given that it did not, should the court take it into account? I think that,
other things being equal, it should. If the Hand test sets the just standard
for responsibility in negligence, then people should observe it, whether it
is legally binding or not. Even where it is impractical to be guided by it
before the accident, people should accept it as a basis for settlement of
damages claims after the harm occurred. At the very least people should
agree to conform to it in order to help in establishing or maintaining a
social practice which will be, by hypothesis, just if generally complied
with it. Given that it is the relevant test which applies to individuals, it
should, by Perry's own standard, be the basis of the courts' decisions.
If I am right so far, then, other things being equal, the distinction
between the forward-looking considerations, which Perry condemns, and
the so-called "morally relevant" ones, which he approves of, is illusory.
129. Perry, supra note 2, at 983.
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Of course, other things are not equal. If the Hand test is not already
widely observed, for example, then my adhering to it is merely Quixotic.
It will do no good, and I have no reason to adhere to it. Given that I do
not have reason to adhere to it the courts may not enforce it against me.
So far so good. Now remove the fiction that the courts do not set
precedents which constrain their future decisions, and return to the real-
ity that they do set binding standards. This, it seems to me, affects what
I ought to do. I now know, or can know, that the court should, if it
could do so without injustice, adopt the Hand test, because if it does it
will set the just standard for society and the court is bound to be aware of
the impact of its decisions and to use its power to best effect. I know that
the court knows that I know that. Given my knowledge I am forewarned
that the Hand formula would be applied. And that means that it is not
unjust to apply it against me. Formally speaking, once the complex
reflexivity of the situation is carefully spelt out, the result is a tie. It is
just to apply the test if I am forewarned that it will be applied, and I am
forewarned of that, i.e. that it will be applied if I am forewarned. To be
forewarned that it will apply if I am forewarned is not the same as to be
forewarned that it will apply. But once we add the extra element, that is,
that the courts' practice is to apply such standards, then I have the rele-
vant warning. So in countries in which such a practice exists it is, other
things being equal, just.
It should be emphasised again that other things are not always
equal. For example, if a less than completely just solution is established
precedent, then it may be reasonable for individuals, in contemporary
common law countries, to assume that the precedent is likely to be fol-
lowed, because it reflects judicial attitudes, or because it will be thought
to have been the basis of many settled expectations, and so on. This is
why courts sometimes may not overrule, for doing so may be unjust to
the litigants. Generally, however, the fact that a court's decision con-
strains future decisions is relevant information, available both to the par-
ties and to the court, and affecting what is just between the parties in a
way that brings it into line with what is morally best for society at large.
Where did Perry go wrong? Consider the passage in which he
asserts that "[a] forward-looking exclusionary rule is a standard which is
intended to provide exclusionary guidance for citizens but which at the
same time does not bear in any direct way on the moral resolution of
existing disputes."' 130 This passage incorporates two mistakes. First, it
130. Id. at 982-83.
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assumes that whereas it is possible to set rules which are epistemically-
bound exclusionary reasons on the basis of considerations affecting jus-
tice between the parties only, it is impossible to set rules which are exclu-
sionary reasons of other kinds on the basis of such considerations. In
other words, Perry confuses (in the case of ordinary exclusionary rea-
sons) the distinction between the effects of a ruling and the reasons for it.
He wrongly assumes that the effects of a ruling of an ordinary exclusion-
ary kind make it logically impossible to argue for it on grounds of justice
between the parties. Contrariwise, he equally wrongly assumes that a
rule which is epistemically-bound must be accepted on grounds of justice
between the parties and nothing more. Second, he is wrong in thinking
that the binding force of precedent has no moral implication to the rela-
tions between the litigants. He fails to see how it can affect what is just
between the parties, just as any other fact can.'
IV. QUESTIONS OF VALUE AND AUTONOMY
A. WELL-BEING
In Regan's sketchy discussion of my remarks on well-being and on
the role of social forms he manages to raise some penetrating and far-
reaching questions. The importance of the problems he touches on, and
the admitted incompleteness of his arguments, indicate that it is best to
leave these matters for further contemplation. It may be best to await
the full articulation and defence of Regan's views in his forthcoming
book. Given, however, that he claims to have produced some conclusive
ad hominem arguments against some of my views, I will venture a few,
rather disjointed and incomplete, observations.
Regan thinks that ultimately people's well-being is not what counts.
People pursue (or strive to pursue) valuable goals, not people's well-
being.' 32 He thinks that my argument against the independent value of
131. One last remark on a related issue. Perry is right to point out that much of private law is
dispositive, and that some of it, like the rules of strict liability, cannot directly guide behaviour. Id.
at 986. He fails to realise, however, that dispositive rules guide behaviour barring agreement
between the parties, and that rules which do not directly guide behaviour may guide it indirectly, for
example, by determining the cost of certain activities thus affecting one's decision whether to engage
in them, under what conditions to do so, and the like.
132. This view is consistent with admitting that advancing some of those goals will advance
people's well-being. Regan mentions, for example, both community and friendship as valuable goals.
(Though his suggestion that there is a strong relation between the two indicates that we are likely to
be at odds in our understanding of at least one of them.)
Regan may even go further and claim that any time one advances a worthwhile goal one serves
the well-being of some people, i.e. those who pursue it. I rather doubt this, but two facts suggest that
Regan may hold this view. First, whereas I expected him, having rejected the independent value of
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desire satisfaction also shows that I am wrong to hold that individual
well-being matters. I believe this is mistaken for a variety of reasons.
My argument rests on the point, with which Regan agrees, that people
do not desire the satisfaction of their false desires, i.e. those based on
false beliefs, where the falsity of the beliefs undermines their reason for
the desire. It follows that one cannot support the value of desire satisfac-
tion on the ground that by satisfying people's desires one gives people
what they want. The seemingly tautological "people desire the satisfac-
tion of their desires" is in fact deeply misleading, and, when understood
in some natural ways, is false. I made this point to undermine a certain
intuition which may move people to support the independent value of
desire-satisfaction. A sensible outlook based on the view that we should
give people what they desire should take account of the fact that their
desires are premised on certain assumptions, and recognize that when
individual well-being, to base his own views on the value of certain (possible) goals, he does in fact
refer continuously not to worthwhile goals but to worthwhile goals which are in fact pursued by
people. This may be explained by a belief that only pursued values are worth pursuing, i.e., that only
they are values. Second, in criticizing my view that not the realisation of one's valuable goals but
only one's contribution to their realisation matters, Regan seems committed to identifying the suc-
cess of people's worthwhile goals with their well-being. These two points taken together suggest that
while people's well-being may not matter in itself, whatever one has reason to do will serve the well-
being of people. Regan is right to point out that while this is so, the action of those who are guided
by his principles will differ from the action of those who are moved by people's well-being. The
latter will be guided by certain views about the strength of the competing reasons to serve the well-
being of various people, which are absent from his principles.
In two respects I have failed to be as clear as I should have been. Regan's resulting misunder-
standing of my views on these matters may have exaggerated the appearance of our disagreement.
When I said that not all aspects of the success or failure of people's goals, or projects, reflect on their
well-being I was thinking of goals such as finding a cure for AIDS, or solving the problem of the
homeless. Regan may have in minds goals in a slighly different sense, according to which an individ-
ual's goals are rarely more than making a contribution to achieving the goals which I had in mind.
In that sense the success and failure of his goals affect his well-being. In my rather expansive sense
they do not always do so. For in the narrow sense of "goals," their success or failure is the success
or failure of the person who has them. In the wider sense of the term this is not necessarily so. I did
not mean, as Regan suspects that I did, that people's well-being is merely a function of success or
failure which is due entirely to their mental diligence, intentions, negligence, etc. So-called "objec-
tive" factors, which are beyond the control of people, may well affect their well-being.
Second, while in my view people's well being is independently valuable, it may be misleading to
say that people have reason to maximize my (as well as anyone else's) well-being. Quite apart from
the fact that considerations of the incommensurability of options make reference to maximization
inappropriate, this goal is in one sense an impossible one to all but the agent concerned. Given that
well-being largely consists in the successful pursuit of worthwhile goals, it is up to the person con-
cerned. Others can help, mainly by helping to ensure the conditions necessary for a life spent in that
way. They ought to do that because well-being counts, but it is impossible for anyone to actually
secure the well-being of another. This point, while not eliminating the difference between Regan's
views and mine, does, I think, indicate that the difference between our views may be thinner than it
might appear to those who overlook it.
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those assumptions fail there is, normally, no reason to respect the desires
premised on them.
Regan, using another view which we share, namely that "it is false
that we pursue our goals because their pursuit serves our well-being"
claims that since people do not aim at their own well-being there is not
reason, which I can rely on, to regard it as a value.133 This is a non-
sequitur. At most Regan can conclude that insofar as we value giving
people what they want, or rather what their actions are aimed at, we
have no reason to promote their well-being. 134 This conclusion does not
in the least undermine my belief in the independent value of well-being.
One purpose of my discussion of the issue was to deny that there is any
reason why we should give people what they desire, when this is under-
stood in a straightforward and ordinary way. Naturally, I would not
wish to argue for the value of people's well-being on the ground that that
is what they want or that it is what they aim at in their actions.
My argument was different. 135 It was that to the extent that we care
about people 136 we care about their well-being, for that is what caring
about people means. I buttressed these points by pointing to the contrast
between well-being and desire satisfaction, and, a point crucial for our
present discussion, by pointing to the coincidence between the agent's
and the outsider's view on this. When I consider my own life, and evalu-
ate its course, what matters to me is my well-being, i.e. the extent my life
was spent in the pursuit of worthwhile goals. The same is true generally
of people's evaluations of their own life.' 3 7 When outsiders consider
what they may do for me, and are, as I claim they should be, concerned
with my well-being rather than with satisfying my desires, they are acting
in tune with the way I think of myself, and with the way I would, were I
clearheaded, wish them to think of me.
Can I consistently claim that in their actions people do not normally
aim at their own well-being and maintain that when they think of their
own lives what matters to people is their own well-being? I think so.
133. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 317. Regan's main concern is to
argue that politics should not be motivated by the goal of advancing the well-being of people. See
Regan, supra note 63, at 1042-43. But it seems that he denies well-being independent value alto-
gether. See id.
134. Even this is an exaggeration for all I was disputing in the quoted sentence is that people
always, or generally, aim at their well-being in their actions.
135. Though obviously I was not explicit enough in spelling it out.
136. I.e., about people generally, rather than about those who are our friends, relations, etc.




The point is too complex to be adequately analysed here, but a partial
analysis will suffice. It is not merely that people need not always aim at
their well-being in their actions. It is not merely that those who do so are
unappealing individuals with narrow sympathies. Nor is it merely that a
whole range of relationships and projects cannot be pursued for this rea-
son, for by their nature they can be pursued only for their own sake, or
for the sake of other people, so that they remain beyond the reach of
people who always aim at their own well being. The point to emphasize
here is a more radical one. Those who aim only at their own well-being
cannot prosper.
The reason is conceptual. For the main part, barring the necessities
for comfortable survival as a person and some other elements, one's well-
being is determined by one's pursuits. It depends on the value of one's
pursuits and one's success in them. But what counts is one's success in
the pursuit one chose for oneself. There is no independent identity to
one's well-being that could guide one's choice of pursuits and activities.
Can I choose to write a novel in order to advance my well-being? I can
do so to advance my well-being instrumentally. I can do so to earn
money, or to gain admission to literary circles. But all this will advance
my well-being only if I could use the money, or my new social standing,
in ways which advance my well-being. Assuming that my health and
other needs for survival as a person are met, or will be met even if I
choose an alternative pursuit, my decision to become a novelist can
advance my well-being only because by choosing to become one I rede-
fine the conditions of my well-being. From now on if I am a good novel-
ist I will have a better life than if I become a lousy one, or fail to write
any novels at all. As it happens I never set myself to become a novelist,
and therefore my failure to write novels does not reflect on my life one
way or another. The same goes for my pursuit of a friendship with a
particular person. Having set out to become that person's friend, failure
to keep his friendship is my failure in a way it would not be if I never set
myself to cultivate his friendship.
So my choice of goals defines what conditions have to be met for me
to prosper, for my life to go well. I cannot choose the pursuits in order to
prosper. Of course all this has to be heavily qualified, and clarified.
First, there are the needs of survival as a person. But they cannot be my
only aims if I am to propser. For a life of mere survival is not a flourish-
ing life. To have a good life I must do something other than merely
survive. Second, I may choose other pursuits with a view to my chances
of succeeding in them. Since I am aware that my well-being will be
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advanced by successful pursuit of worthwhile goals, I can look among
worthwhile goals for those I am likely to succeed in, in order to make
sure that I prosper. This indeed is true. It is irrational not to take
account of one's chances of success and to choose one's goals irrespective
of one's talents and limitations, or of the objective conditions. Can one
choose one's goals with only one view, saying to oneself "I'll choose any-
thing provided I am more likely to succeed in it than in any alternative,
for that is the best way I can advance my well-being?" That seems to be
the only way in which one can make one's own life be dominated by
concern for one's well-being, and flourish. But I tend to think that this
avenue is closed.
For it to be open one should be able to believe that success, for that
is one's overall goal according to our supposition, is the best goal avail-
able to one. That is, regarding any project one is about to embark on in
this spirit one has to believe that the greater success one is likely to
achieve in it makes it the best of all the alternative projects available to
one (i.e. that none of the available alternatives is better). If one does not
believe that, then one can only choose that project erratically and irra-
tionally, and that will not advance one's well-being. It is unlikely that
the condition will be continuously met in any person's life. Suppose,
however, that some people are so obsessed with their own well-being that
they delude themselves believing that the condition is met. Can they
prosper by sheer pursuit of their own well-being? No, for they are caught
by the argument with which this subsection started. Their desires are
premised on the assumption that they are not false desires. Only if they
are not false desires can their pursuit be conducive, without qualification,
to their well-being. By hypothesis their desires are false, being based on
self-deluding beliefs. If this line of reasoning is correct, then it is impossi-
ble (barring miraculous conditions in which the belief that success is
one's best goal is true for all one's options) to advance one's well-being by
aiming only at it.
Could not one do whatever seems best, without giving improper
weight to one's chances of success, because one is concerned only with
one's well-being and was convinced by the argument in the previous par-
agraph that the best way to pursue it is to disregard that consideration
and simply do what is best? At this point the difference between the
people who always reason correctly (and do not give weight to their own
well-being, except regarding their needs for survival as persons), and do
it all in order to promote their well-being, and those who act in exactly
the same way and know that by doing this they do the best they can to
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promote their well-being, though that is not their aim, seems to me to
have disappeared. This is not because it is difficult in general to distin-
guish between aiming at a goal and knowing for certain that it will be
realised by one's action. But it may be impossible to distinguish between
the two when the fact that the goal will be realised is an immediate logi-
cal consequence of one's action.
38
This lengthy detour brings out some features which are crucial to
various aspects of my views. It explains, for example, that there is a
conceptual reason for holding that there is no essential conflict between
individuals' concern for their own well-being and their moral obligations,
or more generally, there is no conflict between one's reasons arising out
of considerations of one's well-being and reasons constituted by other
values. In the context of Regan's observations, my argument shows that
the fact that people do not aim in their actions at promoting their well-
being (when this is the case) does not mean that people do not value their
well-being. On the contrary, the notion of personal well-being captures
what people value about their own lives. Furthermore, all one's actions,
if justified and successful, necessarily serve one's well being. Finally, the
argument explains the difference between the first person and the third
person perspective.
As agents our choices determine the conditions which define our
own well-being. Here well-being is not necessarily our goal. As outsid-
ers, however, our actions affect the well-being of others in the way it was
determined by their choices. Here we find it natural to talk of aiming at
the well-being of others. This is the way that concern for people gener-
ally must express itself.'39
138. This is related to the old question of whether the cannibal who cuts open the chest of his
unconscious victim and extracts his heart for ceremonial eating can plead not guilty to intentional
homicide on the ground that while he knew for certain that his victim will die he did only intend to
extract his heart, and in no way did he intend his death.
If there is anything in this contention it depends on the meaningfulness of the counterfactual (if
you excuse the macabre joke): The cannibal would not have been less successful in his action had
the heartless victim survived. When the consequence is an immediate logical one the counterfactual
cannot be true and the distinction between foresight and intention may well disappear.
139. I should repeat once more that my argument here is rather rough. It also relies on views
not shared by Regan, some of which will be considered in the next section.
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B. CONVENTIONALISM AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
Like Regan, I think that social forms, social practices, are essential
to the availability of many valuable options. Like him I am not a con-
ventionalist, since I believe neither that all existing social practices estab-
lish or support valuable forms of activity or relationships, nor that the
value put on a pursuit or activity by a social practice is its value. Yet, as
Regan recognizes, I believe that the connection between values and social
forms is closer than it is according to him. I am unable to explain the
reasons for this view here, but let me briefly indicate some of its essential
features.
I think that our historical knowledge sets the limits to the imagina-
ble, and that our own practices set the limits to what is feasible for us.
By that I do not mean that we can only imagine what has already hap-
pened nor that we can only act as others around us do. I do mean, how-
ever, that we can only imagine by relating to practices we know of, and
constructing variations on them. The scope for invention is quite wide,
but the further away we stray from forms of pursuits that we know a
good deal about historically the less concrete, the less rich detail, our
imaginings become, and therefore, the less relevant they become to what
we can do.
This is consistent with holding that there are universal moral princi-
ples, so long as we recognize that these universal principles do not enable
us to find out about radically new and unfamiliar values or ways of pur-
suing them. Humor furnishes a familiar example. We may have a good
principle identifying good humor. It is still the case that we cannot
invent radically unfamiliar forms of humor. When we discover a new
culture, and its special forms of humor, we may quickly learn to see that
theirs include many good examples of humor, i.e., examples which are
good by our previously available principle. Yet, there was no way in
which we could have discovered their type of humor, except by discover-
ing the culture that developed it.
I believe that the same goes for forms of art, friendship, family rela-
tionships, hobbies, professions, and other valuable relationships and pur-
suits. This coexistence of universal principles with dependence on
contingent historical traditions seems to me to indicate that social forms
do more than determine the availability of valuable opinions. They con-
stitute them. Regan, who generally rejects this view, betrays its force by
saying that "perhaps no really complex comprehensive goal could be
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invented .by one or two individuals," 1" where one would have expected
him to say "could be discovered." It just does not make sense to think of
discovering completely new forms of valuable activities or relationships,
though new ones can be developed with the emergence of new social
practices.
I do not, of course, believe that new valuable relationships or activi-
ties can be "invented" either, and here I move from emphasising primar-
ily the limits of the imaginable to considering the boundaries of the
feasible.41 They have to emerge with emerging practices.142 Regan pro-
tests that at least simple comprehensive goals can be invented by one or
two individuals. But in saying this he misses two fundamental points.
The first is that the density of texture that I relied on in the arguments he
objects to is not to be understood in terms of complex rules for multiple
eventualities only. It relates to the difference between a blue print (say
the text of a play) and its concrete enactment (in the performance of the
play). The play may be very simple, consisting of only two characters
each delivering a few lines. It still calls for more concreteness than is laid
out in the blue print. Should the line be delivered swiftly or in measured
tones, should the characters wear shoes or trainers, should they be of the
same age or different ages, should they be of the same educational back-
ground or not? Some answers may be provided in the blue print, but not
all can be. Nor can one rely on a closure clause saying that whatever is
not mentioned in the blue print is irrelevant. One would always be able
to imagine changes which were not dreamt of and which are, clearly or
possibly, relevant, such as staging the play in Hell, or during a space-
walk outside Mars, or as taking place between two gods bearing the
names of the characters. We always, of necessity, rely on shared prac-
tices and understanding which extend far beyond the blue print to deter-
mine what is relevant and what is not, what is permissible and what is
not.
Regan might retort that this shows that individuals cannot invent a
new social form as a blue print, but they can invent it as they go along,
over time. But that already changes the nature of what they are doing.
140. See Regan, supra note 63, at 1052.
141. Though variations on existing ones can be developed by individuals.
142. This does not necessarily indicate a lengthy process. The main point is the absence of
design. What emerges does so as a function of the activities of the many rather than created by
design. This does not mean that people cannot try to design new forms. This happens all the time.
It merely means that what emerges is unlikely closely to resemble the intention, and that in any case
it becomes a new valuable form of relationship available to people only after a practice is crystal-
lized. Until that time all one can do is experiment, which is a distinct social form supported by
appropriate practices and shared understandings in our culture.
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They are experimenting. They may do that, subject to the first point, i.e.,
that their imagination is limited by their historical knowledge, which
forms the basis for all their variations. But they cannot follow a fixed
form, they certainly cannot follow an existing one. This is a crucial limi-
tation, for value must be recognized as independent of our invention,
except where the value is that of being inventive or experimental. These
are important values, but they are inevitably parasitic on relatively stable
and independent forms, which form the background for the experimenta-
tion, the standard of deviation, so to speak.
There is an additional consideration of great importance here. Valu-
able options, to be capable of being that, must be capable of providing
reasons for action. This means that they must distinguish between cor-
rect action (i.e., those acts for which they are a reason) and incorrect
actions. This demarcation must be independent of our will, or else it will
not guide us. If we can invent valuable pursuits at will, we are the
guides, not the guided. Experimentation is still possible so long as it is
based on existing forms and amounts to finding variations on them. As I
remarked above, we probably also have practices of experimentation
which designate the boundaries, however imprecisely, of what is accepta-
ble in such activities. The shackling of experimentation, by convention
and by limits on the imaginable, to variations on existing forms, or to
revivals of old ones, can only be engaged in as a special form of activity,
which is clearly parasitic on established norms.
If social forms not only determine the availability of valuable (and
other) options, but also constitute them, then the connection I argued for
between the dependence of value on social forms and incommensurability
is assured. This dependence indicates, though it does not conclusively
prove, the possibility that our ability to compare options depends on the
nature of our social practices, which may "run out" leaving us with no
grounds for comparison.
Like Regan, I too feel that our disagreement on the issue of value
incommensurability touches on the most fundamental issues on which
we disagree. Unfortunately, considering them adequately will take us far
beyond the proper bounds of the present discussion. Like Regan, I too
will merely contribute a few inconclusive observations on the matter,
mine concentrating on some of the points raised by him. 143 The argu-
ment concerning the importance of social forms indicates why I am not
143. The two main issues I will omit from my discussion are Regan's interesting observations on
constitutive incommensurabilities, and on loyalty and commitments. My main problem with
Regan's comments is that he does not appreciate that an important consequence of belief based on
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convinced that even if Regan is right in saying that "the large variety of
activities and relationships we think are valuable can be seen to share
certain common features, which explain and help to commensurate their
value,"' this offers only limited support for the prospect of commensu-
rability. Since the concrete forms in which these values are manifested
depend on contingent historical conditions, and cannot be derived from
the abstract statement of the value, each form of the general value
depends for its meaning on the social practices prevalent, in a way which
defies any attempt to commensurate valuations on the basis of the
abstract features only.
Similarly while Regan is happy to say that even if all our important
decisions concerning major life choices are taken in light of evidence
which is not sufficient to justify a belief that the chosen option is either
better or as good as the rejected ones, nevertheless in principle this is the
case. If social practices constitute valuable options this does not seem
such an inviting possibility. It seems more likely that there is a general
tie between the general features of our beliefs and what is actually the
case. It is not very tight tie. It leaves room for ignorance and mistake on
the part of both individuals and groups. But it is enough to indicate that
the general features of epistemic conditions are correlated with general
ontological conclusions. General epistemic indeterminacy reflects the
incommensurability of values.
The main difficulty Regan has with the idea of incommensurability
is that it fails to explain the difficulty people have in making choices
among allegedly incommensurate options, and their tendency to believe
that continued deliberation may help with the choice.14 5 If the options
the incommensurability of many particular options is that what would appear to those who believe in
total fungibility as just two ways of doing the same thing (e.g., an exchange in kind, or in money, or
foregoing the presence of your friend to make money doing a job out of town or obtaining a house in
exchange for a promise not to communicate with the friend for a month) will be regarded as moving
from the communsurate to the incommensurate. Furthermore, my view on constitutive incommen-
surabilities is based on the premise that these incommensurabilities depend on existing practices and
attitudes. They can be shattered by changing practices and attitudes (it may come to be acceptable
to regard friendship as a commodity and sell it for cash or other benefits the way we sell our old
cars). This, I argued, will be a change in the nature and meaning of friendship, as we know it. That
is why it is a constitutive incommensurability. But to make good these claims I have to make good
my previous claims about the importance of social forms, and much else besides.
144. See Regan, supra note 63, at 1060.
145. Regan's argument that if two options are incommensurate then knowledge that one is more
likely to succeed in pursuing one than in trying the other cannot resolve the incommensurability
seems to me to be based on a mistake. Incommensurability, as discussed by me, holds primarily
between concrete options, and only secondarily between option-types. A concrete option includes
the degree of success to be obtained. More of one thing may be better than a certain amount of
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are recognized to be incommensurate, would not that put an end to all
deliberation and lead to an easy decision? This is a matter of considera-
ble importance to any view of human life which includes a belief in the
important incommensurabilities, such as mine. Indeed it is a large part
of the purpose of such a view radically to reform some aspects of a com-
mon philosophical way to understanding deliberation. Many philosophi-
cal discussions take an excessively intellectualised view of deliberation.1
46
It is regarded exclusively as a matter of puzzling out the correct answer
to questions entirely soluble through fact-finding and reasoning. Once
the correct answer is believed to have been teased out the agent simply
endorses it. The will, if I may put it like this, is the rubber stamp of
reason. Admittedly, sometimes the will rebels, but then the agent is irra-
tional, erratic.
All this seems to me profoundly misguided. The process of delibera-
tion leading to decisions is primarily a matter of resolving to undertake
(or to refrain from) some action, or course of action. The primary object
is the determination of the will. Reasons play an important part in the
process. They indicate the superiority of some options over others. This
is the part which is commonly emphasised to the exclusion of all else.
But that is only part of the story. Beyond this there still is the business of
coming to want to pursue one course rather than another, where reasons
do not indicate the superiority of either. This process, not being purely a
matter of reaching beliefs on the basis of evidence, cannot be described
using the common descriptions of reasoning processes. We need a new
phenomenological account to do it justice. All I can say here is that
reason plays a part in it as well. We choose on the basis of gaining per-
ceived goods and avoiding perceived ills. The process of deliberation
aimed at resolving the will is in large measure a matter of contemplating
the various goods and ills of the alternatives and trying, in one's imagina-
tion, to relate to the options in light of them. Hence, deliberation and
reasoning about the reasons for and against various options may continue
long after one comes to the conclusion (not that it need be consciously
reached) that the options are incommensurate.
another, even if less of the first is incommensurate with that amount of the other. Admittedly not all
degrees of success or failure are matters of more or less, but many are.
146. My view is closer to the cognitivist analysis than to non-cognitivist ones. But it can be seen
as an attempt to give due place to what is true in both approaches.
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C. RIGHTS TO COLLECTIVE GOODS
There is one main issue on which Waldron and I disagree, viz, the
legitimacy of governments taking action to promote valuable opportuni-
ties and to discourage worthless or bad ones. But before I come to dis-
cuss that issue let me comment on some other matters of contention. 147
My claim that we do not generally have individual rights14 to col-
lective goods was first of all an observation of a feature common to many
political theories, all those I was familiar with, and to common opin-
ion.149 My argument that normally there are no such rights is meant to
explain as well as justify this feature of our thought."15 If my explanation
is successful, then there is no right to autonomy, for autonomy requires
the existence of many collective goods. As Waldron correctly observes in
what he regards as his first criticism of my views on the matter, it does
not follow that there are no partial rights based on people's interest in
autonomy. In the book I put the point in the following way:
It is wrong to identify autonomy with a right against coercion, for
example, and to hold that right (i.e., the right against coercion) as
defeating, because of the importance of personal autonomy, all, or
almost all, other considerations. Many rights contribute to making
autonomy possible, but no short list of concrete rights is sufficient for
this purpose. The provision of many collective goods is constitutive of
the very possibility of autonomy and it cannot be relegated to a
subordinate role, compared with some alleged right against coercion,
in the name of autonomy. 151
147. Some issues I will let pass. In particular, Waldron is right that much more needs to be said
on manipulation before it can be fully integrated with the other views I was supporting in my book.
He is also right to say that I do not have an adequate definition of the state, though he is mistaken in
thinking that I claimed to have one. I made claims concerning some essential properties of states,
and even more so of legal systems, of which (in spite of Waldron's suggestion to the contrary) the
Canon Law is one. But I never felt that I had a complete characterisation. It is true that I do not
think that use of coercion is logically necessary for the existence of states or of municipal legal
systems. But since I do believe that it is necessary given social conditions as we have them, and will
remain so for the foreseeable future, the issue does not affect the argument of the Morality of Free-
dom. These issues are discussed at some length in other writings (especially in The Authority of Law,
and in Practical Reason and Norms), texts which Waldron does not examine.
148. For independent reasons, I think that only some of these collective goods are the subject of
group rights. But this is a separate story. Cf. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15,
at 207-09 (concerning the notion of group rights).
149. Similarly, legal systems do not recognise individual rights to collective goods, but there
may be special reasons why no legal recognition and no legal enforcement should be provided to
such rights if they exist at all.
150. Following a similar train of thought, Denise Reaume has since identified a narrower cate-
gory regarding which it is even more counter-intuitive to assume the existence of individual rights.
See Reaume, Individuals, Groups and Rights to Public Goods, 38 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1988).
151. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 207 (emphasis added).
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Waldron's observation that the interest in autonomy is the founda-
tion of some autonomy-based rights is fully recognised in the book. My
concern there was to avoid two false suggestions. One is that those rights
are, as Waldron puts it, "a right to autonomy,"'152 since that would con-
vey the false idea that there is nothing more to autonomy than what is
covered by the right. The second false suggestion is that those auton-
omy-based rights are more important than one's interest in any collective
goods. Since many collective goods are vital for the possibility of auton-
omy, providing them may be as important as providing rights.
My explanation of the non-existence of rights to collective goods
had to do with the fact that the provision of collective goods normally
involves every member of the society, and imposes significant burdens on
them.53 Waldron points to the fact that those people who are subject to
the burdens are also the beneficiaries of them. But that is beside the
point. The fact that I benefit from performing some tortuous exercises
does not make their performance any less burdensome. He has a better
point when he alludes to the fact that the people whose actions contrib-
ute to the collective goods are often contributing happily to it. They do
not regard their contributions as burdensome, and therefore the contri-
butions are not burdensome to them.
This subjective, attitudinal, element in the notion of a burden sug-
gests to me that I could have chosen my words more carefully. I did try
to ward off the danger of misinterpretation by referring to "potentially
burdensome duties."15 But I was clearly more successful when I
referred to the lack of justification to impose duties on the bulk of the
population in matters which deeply affect their lives, or which affect
important aspects of their lives.' 55 The fact that the duties affect the bulk
of the population matters here, as does the fact that the behaviour called
for affects one's life in important aspects.
152. Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
1097, 1123 (1989).
153. Regan objects that given my understanding of rights I am not entitled to rely on considera-
tions deriving from the weight of reasons for the right. He points out that on my view rights give
rise to duties, and duties are not necessarily weighty reasons. That is indeed my view, but I believe
that the weight of the reasons underpinning a duty is related to the nature of the countervailing
reasons likely to be encountered on the occasions on which the duty is to be performed. If the
reasons for the act are likely to be overridden on all, or most, occasions for its performance then we
will not call it a duty. This observation is only a very rough approximation of the truth on this
matter. I agree with Regan, and with Green, that what I had to say on the nature of duties generally
is far from satisfactory.
154. J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 247.
155. Id. at 203, 247.
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But if I myself benefit from behaving in the required way, does it not
make it easier to require it of me? To be sure it does, and as Waldron
observes I have no difficulty in saying that people have duties to behave
in that way. The only question is whether they have rights that others so
behave. A right has to be based on the interest of the right-holder. The
duty may be based on the interest of the person subject to it, or on the
interest of the world at large.156 This brings us to the third of Waldron's
points. He says that when an interest is common to all individuals then it
justifies not only recognising a duty to respect it, it also justifies talking of
rights, even if the interest of no single individual would be a sufficient
foundation for a right. My own view is that rights are based on the inter-
est of the right-holder. 57
There is an important twist in the argument which must be carefully
attended to. The importance of the right-holder's interest may depend
on the way it serves the interest of others. That is why important state
officials may be entitled to special protection. Protecting them serves
their interest, but in doing so the interest of the population at large is also
served, in a way in which it is not served by protecting me. I have tried
to show158 that basic constitutional rights are indeed respected not
merely because they serve the right-holders' interests severally, but
because the protection of one individual's interests serves to protect the
interests of others as well. This solves the problem Waldron raises in his
third criticism without giving up the crucial connection between the right
and the individual interest of the right-holder. As I have also argued,
however, the interests of individuals in collective goods are commonly
not of this kind. Your interest in an artistic, cultured, enlightened, beau-
tiful, and otherwise desirable environment is served alongside serving my
similar interest, but it is not served because it serves my interest. That
my interest is being served is not causally instrumental in serving yours.
But protecting my interest in free expression is causally instrumental in
protecting yours.
D. MORAL INDIVIDUALISM
Waldron does not exactly disagree with what I have to say about
individualism, but he thinks that I usurped the term to designate a non-
existent target. I will be brief in saying a little to suggest that the target is
156. Hence, Waldron's allegation that I cannot consistently claim that there are autonomy-
based duties but no right to autonomy is misconceived. Besides, as I pointed out above, there are
also autonomy-based rights. There just is not a right to autonomy.
157. See J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 247-48.
158. See id. at 230.
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real enough. I defined "moral individualism" (conceding that this is
partly a stipulative definition) as the view "that only states of individual
human beings or aspects of their lives, can be intrinsically valuable."' 59
Something is intrinsically valuable if and only if its value does not derive
entirely from its (actual or likely) consequences, nor from consequences
it can be used to bring about. Among people, philosophers, and others
whom I know moral individualism in this sense is either the accepted
view or a constant temptation. This is not surprising. If people are what
matters, does it not follow that only states of those people can be non-
instrumentally good?
Moreover, many people believe in a mental state version of moral
individualism. They believe that only people's mental states can be non-
instrumentally valuable since they regard the well-being of people to con-
sisting in their states of mind and attitudes, be they equated with happi-
ness or not. The crucial point is that it seems paradoxical to many that
people may be well-off but unaware of this. If it is impossible for people
to be unaware that they are well-off, or that their lives are, intrinsically,
bad for them (for of course people may be unaware that their lives are
bad for their country, their relations or for human culture, etc.), then
only conscious mental states or attitudes can have non-instrumental
value.
My counter-argument consisted in showing that autonomy is intrin-
sically valuable, and that collective goods are essentially constituent parts
of autonomy. It follows that collective goods (that is, states of society)
are intrinsically good. We should think of the good life as having an
essential, non-instrumental, social component, as being life in a certain
environment, and, of course, as something the goodness of which the
agent himself may be unaware of. These seem to me to be important and
controversial points. Waldron thinks that this is an empty proof because,
first, I have only shown that collective goods are non-instrumentally
good, not that they are good in themselves, and, second, I do not deny
that collective goods are good only because they contribute to the well-
being of people.
I suspect that there are very few things which are good in them-
selves. Something is good in itself if it is good whatever else is the case.
It must be good even in a world of post-nuclear devastation, in which
people are subject to horrendous diseases, fears and traumas, or it must
159. Id. at 18.
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be good even in a world in which the very existence of some people con-
tributes to the perpetuation of great afflictions on the rest of humanity,
and so on. I suspect that few things survive such tests. Certainly, most
of the joys of our normal life, be they success in one's career, leisure
pursuits, the very joy of existence, and the like, fail such tests. Most of
the intrinsic goods are good in certain contexts. There is no surprise that
the same is true of the collective goods which contribute to autonomy.
In fact, the same is true of autonomy itself.
Finally, I do not, of course, deny that what ultimately matters is the
well-being of people. The whole point of my argument was to show that
there is this viable position which denies that only states of people are
intrinsically good, and yet maintains the moral significance of people,
and is not led to the aggrandisement of, for example, nations or states. I
am glad that Waldron finds this view unproblematic, but I am afraid that
many others will not.
E. THE VALUE OF AUTONOMY
Waldron regrets the fact that I do not regard autonomy as a univer-
sal value. But he gives no reason to think that it is a universal value. To
be a universal value it must be the case that people who lack personal
autonomy cannot be completely well-off, or have a completely good life.
I offered my version of an essentially Aristotelian account of well-being
according to which it consists in successful pursuit of worthwhile activi-
ties in a life free from repression of important aspects of one's
personality.
I think that there were, and there can be, non-repressive societies,
and ones which enable people to spend their lives in worthwhile pursuits,
even though their pursuits and the options open to them are not subject
to individual choice. Careers may be determined by custom, marriages
arranged by parents, child-bearing and child-rearing controlled only by
sexual passion and traditions, past-time activities few and traditional,
and engagement in them required rather than optional. In such societies,
with little mobility, even friends are not chosen. There are few people
one ever comes in contact with, they remain there from birth to death,
and one just has to get on with them. I do not see that the absence of
choice diminishes the value of human relations or the display of excel-
lence in technical skills, physical ability, spirit and enterprise, leadership,
scholarship, creativity, or imaginativeness, which can all be encompassed
in such lives.
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Of course, to succeed in such lives one's socialisation has to succeed,
and one must engage in the various pursuits wholeheartedly. But it is a
mistake to think that what is chosen is more likely to attract our dedica-
tion or involvement than what is not. Of course, Waldron may feel that
good as such non-autonomous lives can be they could always be
improved if they were also autonomous. As I have argued, however, you
cannot just add autonomy, that is, free choice, to the same life. Auton-
omy is not something we have on top of everything else. It is an aspect of
the other values in our lives. The careers, relationships, and other pur-
suits in our societies are partly constituted by the fact that they have to
be chosen to be engaged in as they ought to be engaged. The fact that
they were freely chosen is part of what makes them into what they are.
It makes no sense to say that a life with autonomy is better than the same
life without autonomy. Can one say then that any life with autonomy is
better than any life without it? This seems to me patently implausible.
My reply is in the extensive argument (The Morality of Freedom ch. 13)
about the incommensurability of such alternatives.
Waldron suspects that this modesty about the value of personal
autonomy undermines the injunction to protect and provide the condi-
tions of autonomy for all members of our societies. This is true only if
one contemplates a global change of conditions, as do those advocates of
a return to a pre-industrial community, or to a post-modernist perpetual
revolution. They cannot be rebutted by saying that in their societies peo-
ple will not have personal autonomy. They have to be resisted with the
simpler argument that large scale social design is a leap into the dark
where the only certainty is that the results will be totally unlike what was
hoped for. Normal politics, to our relief, is not concerned with large
scale social design. Its business is to conduct our affairs within the
existing, though ever-changing (in part because of political interventions)
social structures. That means that in normal politics providing and pro-
tecting the conditions of personal autonomy is essential to the promotion
of individual well-being.160
160. Let me mention here one other argument of Waldron's that I cannot stop to consider at
length. He agrees that autonomy is valuable only if used in valuable pursuits, but objects to my
explicit argument to that effect. See Waldron, supra note 152, at 1127. I pointed out that an autono-
mous, demeaning, bad, or worthless life is worse than a non-autonomous life which is bad, demean-
ing, or worthless in similar ways. Waldron's objection is based on an analogy with virtue. But
autonomy is not a virtue but a property of a life. The question is, does that property contribute to
the value of the life. The answer, to which we both agree, is that it does so only if the life is spent in
valuable pursuits. This is what I sought to show. The examples which I used, and that he criticises,
show not that certain activities are bad even if autonomously undertaken. They show that undertak-
ing them autonomously makes them worse. Neglecting one's child freely and autonomously is worse
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Oddly enough a related point is made by Regan. 161 He is sympa-
thetic to the view that personal autonomy is valuable in societies which
conform to certain conditions, but he thinks that that makes nonsense of
the claim that the state should provide individuals with an adequate
range of options. His point is valid only if all or at least enough of the
options available in a society are always available to all its members.
This is far from being the case. Much, if not most, of the movement for
social reform in the last two centuries was motivated by a desire to make
opportunities, which are available to some, open to all. Such aspirations
are not justified if they are aspirations for all options to be available to
everyone. All that is required is that enough options be available to each
person. In complex modem societies this inevitably means that many
more options than can be realistically available to each person must form
the pool of options in the society. What Regan overlooks is that in mod-
em pluralistic societies socialization introduces people, as it must to pre-
pare them for life in those societies, to the value of choice, and of self-
determination. That is the only way they can make sense of the social
structures surrounding them. If it turns out that the range of options
actually open to them, unlike those available to others in their society, is
disablingly restrictive, they have a legitimate grievance.
162
than neglecting one's child out of necessity and without real choice. Waldron does not seem to
address that aspect of the argument.
161. Regan, supra note 63, at 1081.
162. As my discussion in the book makes clear this argument is not meant to apply to isolated
cultural enclaves which maintain worthwhile, viable traditions which are not autonomy-based.
Let me add here a comment on two other points raised by Regan. Contrary to his assertion, id.
at 1084, there is no contradiction in claiming both that autonomy is intrinsically valuable and that
the fact that people's lives are autonomous contributes to their well-being only to the extent that they
engage in worthwhile pursuits. What is intrinsically valuable can be, and in the case of autonomy is,
valuable as a constituent of a good in itself. Remove other elements of the good in itself and it may
turn worthless, or even bad. Finally, Regan is right to point out that the "Clumsy tool" argument,
id. at 1083, in support of the Harm Principle does not extend against the use of various forms of
manipulation. My advocacy of the principle was meant to downgrade it to a sound practical princi-
ple to guide governmental action. I do not regard it as a fundamental principle of morality. As a
practical, or pragmatic principle there is a lot to recommend it. Regan is right to point to the
considerable support it receives from pragmatic concerns with governmental mistakes, incom-
petencies, and insensitivities. I think that the clumsy tool argument, understood as expressing a
practical concern about the operation of coercion in our societies, and not as an argument of princi-
ple about its operation in some sanitized social conditions, lends further important support to the
principle.
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V. POLITICAL LIBERTY
A. THE NATURALNESS OF PERFECTIONISM
Waldron challenges my contention that perfectionism is the "natu-
ral" stance of governments. Let me therefore attempt to clarify the main
propositions leading to that view. The view is, let us remind ourselves,
that in principle all moral reasons are fair game for governmental action.
"Perfectionism" is merely a term used to indicate that there is no funda-
mental principled inhibition on governments acting for any valid moral
reason, though there are many strategic inhibitions on doing so in certain
classes of cases. My view rests on three propositions.
The first is a logical point. That an act is good is a reason to do it,
that a state of affairs is good is a reason to bring it about. Alternatively,
that an act or a state of affairs is good entails that there are reasons to do
it, or bring it about. Evaluations are connected with reasons. Of course,
the fact that something is good does not show that one ought to bring it
about. There may be other goods one could bring about, and some may
be no less important, so that one has a choice, barring the ability to bring
about all of them, as to which goods one should pursue. The good act or
state of affairs may also have bad aspects or consequences, or the good
act may be impossible to perform, or the good result impossible to bring
about. But it does not make sense to say of a state of affairs that it is
good but that fact is no reason whatsoever to do anything about it. If the
value of our actions or of their consequences is no reason for action, then
what can be such a reason? If there is a gap here, there is nothing to fill
it.
Some may say that what is needed is the further claim that what is
good is good for the agent. If something is just good, it certainly does not
follow that it is good for me. Saving a crowd of civilians by throwing
oneself on a bomb which is about to go off and kill them is not good for
the person who so sacrifices his life. Could he then say: It is good to
save those people but I have no reason to do so? On this view there are
no moral reasons except self-interested ones. Worse still, on this view the
only reasons people ever have are self-interested reasons. One can never
work to save an endangered species because of the value of their preser-
vation, never give a donation to a charity because it will help the needy,
never contribute to the preservation of Venice because of its cultural
value. All one's reasons are self-serving and one's only concern is with
one's own well-being. The untenability of that position has been argued
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far too often for me to repeat it. Hence the first proposition: If some-
thing is valuable, then there is a (not necessarily conclusive) reason to
bring it about or preserve it.
The second proposition is that the reasons which should guide gov-
ernments are the reasons which should guide their subjects, and which
governments are particularly suited to conform to, or realise. This prop-
osition is the main subject of Part One of The Morality of Freedom, and I
will not expand on it here. Briefly, I have argued that governments
ought to act for dependent reasons, that is, those which apply to their
subjects anyway, and that their authority is limited by two main consid-
erations. First, they should act only where their intervention is likely to
lead to greater conformity with those reasons than is likely if they do not
intervene. Second, they should not intervene where it is more important
that their subjects should decide for themselves than that they should get
the right results.
It follows from these two propositions that governments should act
on perfectionist reasons unless there are special reasons to think that they
are incompetent in such matters, or unless there are issues where it is
more important to leave the decision with ordinary people even if they
will decide mistakenly. The third proposition I am relying on is that
while the two qualifications just mentioned act in many cases to restrict
governmental action, they do not rule out perfectionist considerations
altogether. Perfectionism is not to be equated with the view that govern-
ments should always pursue all moral considerations at all costs. It is the
view that whether or not a particular moral objective should be pursued
by legal means is a question to be judged on the merit of each case, or
class of cases, and not by a general exclusionary rule, as the so-called
"neutralists" would have it.
There is reason to think that proper legal arrangements can, for
example, curtail the invasion of commercialism into personal matters,
like parenthood, by providing for legal adoptions based on non-commer-
cial considerations, and making commercial transactions in babies unen-
forceable. Other moral goals, like the cultivation of brotherly love, are
beyond legal intervention, which would only be self-defeating. Often it is
not a question of whether or not to intervene, but what measures to take.
Sometimes marginal legal measures can do some good, whereas a head-
long legal attack on the problem will be counter-productive. In all this
the question of what trust one can put in the political machine to reach
sensible results looms large, and leads to a good deal of restraint. The
same cautious approach, I claimed, is suited to issues that "neutralists"
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regard as fair game for governmental action. Non-discrimination and
desegregation are examples of problems where some legal intervention
can do some good, whereas other measures can do a good deal of harm.
In The Morality of Freedom I pointed out that the issues favoured
by "neutralists" and the issues that they rule out involve judgment on
similar questions of value, that the two stem from a common moral
root. 16 3 Waldron is right to say that this does not refute all views which
deny that governments are roughly equally liable to make mistakes on
both fronts. But I do think that it creates a presumption that that is so.
Waldron does nothing to refute it. Perfectionism is the natural position.
But that does not show that it is right. "Neutralists" may have cogent
counter-arguments. I tried to show that some arguments put forward in
recent years are not cogent. But I know of no general argument that
"neutralism" must be wrong.
B. REASONS FOR THE EXCLUSION OF IDEALS
Before we turn, finally, to Waldron's arguments in support of the
exclusion of ideals from politics, I would like to clarify my view on a few
relevant points, for in the pages leading up to his final argument Waldron
somewhat misrepresents my position on a few issues.
First, as I mentioned above, I do not deny that most government
actions rely on coercion as a means of ultimate enforcement. I think,
however, that the role of coercion in politics is often exaggerated. It is
important to remember the symbolic effect of governments' pronounce-
ments and their ability to set the tone of the national debate and affect
the national mood. It is also important to remember that an ever-grow-
ing proportion of government business is done not through using its
authority or its coercive powers, but through its intervention in the econ-
omy under the same rules which apply to other actors, while flexing its
enormous economic muscle to political ends.
Second, the measures I supported avoid direct coercion for perfec-
tionist causes. The coercion that they involve can be fully justified on the
grounds of protecting and promoting individual autonomy. The simplest
example is that of taxation. Taxation is coercive. It is justified in my
yiew only inasmuch as it is useful for the promotion and protection of
autonomy for all. But in deciding how to use tax revenue, the govern-
ment, having already performed the main coercive act on other grounds,
should prefer to use it to encourage valuable pursuits, say schools, public
163. See J. RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 110-33.
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parks, sports facilities, preservation of historic buildings, provision of
medical services, rather than on others, say free supply of pornogra-
phy. 164 I am not sure whether Waldron disagrees with this position. If I
understand him correctly, he agrees subject to the distortion argument to
which we will come below.
Third, Waldron is right that a much more detailed analysis of the
different ways in which coercion enters into governmental action and col-
ors its effects is needed.16 He makes some useful suggestions in this
direction, for which I am grateful. He is, however, considering threats,
whereas I was concerned with coercion, and coercive threats only.
Clearly, not all threats are coercive ones, as his examples demonstrate.
This discrepancy helps explain, to a limited degree, why he finds more
coercion in the law than I do. There are many legal examples of non-
coercive threats. To my mind it is important to remember, however, that
only coercive threats invade autonomy, and are subject to the particular
objections with which I was concerned.
One side issue arising here is Waldron's denial of my suggestion that
coerced acts are always either justified or excused. His one reason is that
"there may be some acts which are never justified or excused by coer-
cion."' 66 This seems to me true. But it is also true that in those cases I
cannot claim that I was coerced to do what I did. Let us assume that one
should not under any circumstances kill one's mother, and that such
action is never excused. A person who is threatened with death unless he
kills his mother and kills her cannot say that he was coerced to do so.
This is precisely because he should have refused to kill her even at the
cost of his own life.
Finally, in examining the possibility of resort to taxation and subsi-
dies in support of sound moral ideals, Waldron, wishing to isolate the
issue, assumes that the tax or subsidy is not justified for redistributive
reasons. But this misrepresents the whole thrust of my analysis. In my
view, consideration of the protection and promotion of autonomy pro-
vides the basic grounds which determine issues of justice and distribu-
tion. They cannot be separated from them.
Waldron's core argument for the exclusion of ideals is that govern-
mental intervention usurps a decision which should be left to individuals.
There is, of course, something left to individuals, namely, deciding which
164. See id. at 417-18. This, I would say, applies also to the tax on fox hunting example that
Waldron mentions. See Waldron, supra note 152, at 1141-47.
165. See Waldron, supra note 152, at 1138-41.
166. Id. at 1144.
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options to pursue after the government interfered in the matter and
affected the odds in favour of some options and against others, but that is
the wrong decision for them. They are entitled to choose on the merits of
the case, as it is free from government intervention.
As it stands, the argument has a breath-taking generality. If valid it
amounts to the rejection of all authority. All authority, if it is legitimate,
decides on the merits, relying on dependent reasons, that is, ones which
apply to its subjects, and takes action which changes the initial balance of
reasons in order to secure better conformity with that initial balance than
was likely but for the authority's intervention. If that is treating people
like babies, or manipulating them, then all authority is illegitimate.
There is no comfort to the "neutralist" in this argument. 167 What Wal-
dron needs is a different argument which shows that certain issues are
better left to individuals. He cannot rely on a blanket claim that all
issues should be left to individuals. It is, of course, part of my own argu-
ment that certain issues are better left to individuals.' 68 But there is no
argument I know of, and none that Waldron provides, to explain why the
pursuit by political means of all ideals should be banned on this ground.
The implausibility of the argument in its sweeping generality is
made plain by its underlying presupposition that all options have an
intrinsic balance of merits and drawbacks which should guide agents
who choose them. That assumption seems necessary if we are to say,
with Waldron, that any authoritative intervention distorts the "true" bal-
ance which should guide choice. But if authoritative interventions can
effect such distortions, so, presumably, can other interventions. If a mul-
timillionaire buys all tickets to all London concerts and then offers them
for sale at a twenty-five percent discount, his action does not differ much
from governments offering a subsidy to music promoters in exchange for
reducing the price of concert tickets. So presumably this multimillion-
aire is doing us a disservice and should desist. Now imagine that as a
result of political persecution a large number of Hungarian musicians flee
to London where they are willing to appear for lower wages, resulting in
a 25% drop in the price of concert tickets. Is this also a distortion of the
true price of music? Waldron's argument relies on a notion of intrinsic
merit and demerit which is independent of social conditions, and which
in most cases is hard to sustain. Alternatively, he must point to some
167. My own reply to Waldron's argument is in Part One of The Morality of Freedom. See J.
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 23-109.
168. The choice of their friends was the hopefully uncontroversial example I gave in the book.
See id at 57.
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reason why governmental interventions are always wrong, while other
social changes are not. This also seems implausible.
For myself, I believe that very often there is no way of saying what
is the authentic, natural, or uninterfered-with balance of costs and advan-
tages. But even then it is sometimes possible to say that one balance of
costs and advantages is better than others for the people who might be in
one or the other of the contemplated situations. A situation where
parenthood is financially crippling is worse, other things being equal,
than one in which it is not. When this is the case governments should, if
they can do so effectively and without other, serious adverse conse-
quences, act to facilitate the better situation.
This has been a long, and at times tedious article. I saw no way of
acknowledging the force of the many penetrating arguments addressed
against me in the articles assembled here other than to try and deal with
as many of them as I could. Before I started, I hoped to take advantage
of this opportunity and discuss some critical arguments against some of
my views which appeared elsewhere. In the end, the task was so great
that I did not even manage to consider some other arguments advanced
elsewhere by contributors to this Issue, despite their affinity to the argu-
ments they pursued here. It may look disingenuous to conclude by say-
ing that in reading some of the articles my main worry is that they are far
too generous. But in spite of many disagreements on some important
issues, I do mean it. At the same time many comments pointed to short-
comings in my work, and for that I am grateful.
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